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Abstract
This thesis describes a longitudinal study of Bitcoin, the perhaps most popular
blockchain based system today. Public blockchains have emerged as a plausible
messaging substrate for applications that require highly reliable communication.
However, sending messages over existing blockchains can be cumbersome and
costly as miners require payment to establish consensus on the sequence
of messages, since the electricity consumption needed to run miners is not
negligible. The blockchain protocol requires an always growing size of the
information stored in it so its scalability is the biggest problem. For that
reason we decided to collect and store data locally in our own data structure,
necessary for the analysis, allowing us to save up to 10 times the amount
of disk space. Today, systems using the blockchain protocol are emerging,
and cryptocurrencies are a glaring example of its implementation. Bitcoin
represents the largest cryptocurrency on market, and it has to face a massive
scale due to its popularity, having in 2012 about fifty thousands transaction
per day and reaching now, in 2017, more than three hundred fifty thousands
of transactions approved every day.
This massive scale in the system leads to a saturation of the messaging sub-
strate, hence performance issues. In this thesis we will focus also on the Bitcoin
network performance, in particular, transaction throughput and latency. From
2009 to 2017 a lot of analyses on the blockchain have been performed, enhanc-
ing the considerable change in the block size limit, from 256 bytes to 1mb, as
an attempt to overcome scalability problems. Different papers were published,
discussing whether changing or not the block size limit. In addition, the Bitcoin
price increased from ∼0.7$ to more than 7.000$, making the system even
more desirable for miners, but causing several complications in the fee and
reward mechanism. We evaluate and discuss possible ways to improve this fee
mechanism in order to guarantee more revenue for miners along with an user
fee optimization.
We finally present our own system for longitudinal analysis on the Bitcoin
blockchain, bas. It generates a dataset which contains a significant portion of
the whole blockchain, updated on September 2017. We discuss our results and
compare them with other evaluations from past years, considering three main
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key points: scalability, performance and fees/costs. We discuss how scalability
affects performance, and how the costs and fees are dependent from them
both. We want also to take into consideration the environmental impact of
Bitcoin and how it affects the coming of new cryptocurrencies. We evaluate
and propose, using machine learning techniques, two different cost prediction
models that aim to predict bandwidth for upcoming transactions according
the fee they are willing to pay, and the expected revenue for miners according
to the time spent mining. These models can be used by application to throttle
network traffic to optimize message delivery. We also discuss whether the block
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In 1964, Paul Baran [8] described the differences between a centralized, de-
centralized and distributed network. Since then, the attention in developing
systems moved from a centralized scheme to a distributed one, leaving most of
the computation to every single processor in the network rather than a central
coordinator. Such a change might be easy for systems that require little secu-
rity, for instance systems that not do require authentication and authorization.
However, the more secure a system needs to be, the more the decentralization
process might be tricky as it becomes very important to rely on some trusted
central coordinator. Systems requiring stronger security are the ones that are
related to e-commerce, banking, and trade; essentially all systems that have
to deal with money.
In 1983, David Chaum introduced the idea of digital cash [13]. In 1990 he
founded DigiCash, an electronic cash company that closed due to bankruptcy in
1998. After DigiCash, other systems such as e-gold (1996) and PayPal (1998)
emerged. However, systems for digital currency allowed digital money transfer
while they were still relying on a central authority, hence, they were centralized
or decentralized but not distributed. In 2008 Satoshi Nakatomo presented
Bitcoin [35], the first decentralized digital currency. Until 2008 e-commerce
relied exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties. Those
are involved in the electronic payments process and they have to guarantee
consistency of the transactions and security of data.
Decentralized digital currencies are not dependent on any trusted third parties
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and they are built over a Peer to Peer (p2p) network in which every component
has the same privileges. These systems allow money exchange without a
central authority, which means lower fees, no geographical separation and
global trust among users. After Bitcoin, more decentralized digital currencies
emerged, in 2011 Litecoin, originally based on the bitcoin protocol, then in
2013 Gavin Wood presented Ethereum [53] and in 2014 Monero currency was
released.
The transaction ordering is essential in any currency systems, however, es-
tablishing correct order can be problematic in decentralized cryptocurrency
systems as they allow arbitrary nodes to join, including nodes that might be
malicious. If arbitrary or Byzantine faults are allowed, the system might be left
in an inconsistent or invalid state [29]. The ability to mask Byzantine faults
has been implemented in various systems such as Byzantium [18], HRDB [49]
and MITRA [30]. These protocols guarantee consistency of transactions having
f faulty nodes, with a total of N nodes where N = 2f + 1 or N = 3f + 1.
Fireflies [24] is perhaps the only Byzantine-fault tolerant membership protocol
that can support overlay-network sizes of the current Bitcoin network. The
protocol has also been demonstrated efficient in distributing large block of
date. However, the suitability of Byzantine consensus to support cryptocash
has yet to be demonstrated.
1.1 Blockchains
To guarantee the ordering of transaction all these cryptocurrencies rely on the
blockchain protocol. The need to tolerate malicious members was the reason
for introducing the blockchain into cryptocurrency systems. A blockchain is
essentially a distributed database of records or public ledger of all transactions
or digital events that have been executed and shared among participating par-
ties [15]. The fundamental principle behind the blockchain is that consensus
on transaction ordering is based on contributed computational power rather
than number of participants. The blockchain works by appending transac-
tions into blocks. Every block is generated after a relevant computation, called
proof-of-work, and each new block is appended to the public ledger of data,
the blockchain, having in that way an ever growing chain of information con-
taining every transaction ever happened. Blockchains essentially implements
a distributed consensus protocols that enable a set of untrusted processes to
agree on the content of an append only data structure, often referred to as
ledgers. These ledgers are divided into blocks and linked together in sequence
by hashes. They facilitate transactions between consenting individuals who
would otherwise have no means to trust each other and deal with geographi-
cal separation and interfacing difficulties. This technology promises a highly
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resilient and communication substrate where messages are potentially kept for
a long time.
Besides its use in cryptocurrency, blockchain technology opens up to several
usages in different sectors as a basis for a tamper proof audit ledger in eHealth
systems [19], or to execute decentralized data policies [23, 48], in addition,
it is already used by NASDAQ in its private socket market. If used in a p2p
file sharing network, blockchain removes the need of a centralized data base.
Moreover it allows users to create tamper-proof digital identities for themselves
and it opens up to usages in several important sectors such as trading, file
storage, and identity management.
There are several limitations in current blockchain technologies. The most
relevant is scalability, due to the steady growth of the ledger of data. It should
be also considered that decentralized cryptocurrencies operate in open (or
permissions less) networks in which the ledger of data could be manipulated
from arbitrary adversaries. With the emerging of cryptocurrencies, smart con-
tracts came out and they aim to facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation
or performance of a contract [44]. According to Luu et al., 2016 [31], security
of smart contracts has not received much attention yet. Since the only part
not protected by cryptography is the order of transactions [11], an attacker
could try to convince the network that a transaction occurred earlier than
another one to gain money. The security bugs in smart contracts are classified
as Transaction-Ordering Dependence, Timestamp Dependence, Mishandled Excep-
tions and Reentrancy Vulnerability [31]. In this thesis we will not focus on smart
contracts but it is useful to know that in early 2017 RootStock (rsk) project
was launched. RootStock is a smart contract p2p platform built on top of the
Bitcoin blockchain and they are also working on Bitcoin scalability [28]. In this
thesis we refrain from explaining Bitcoin and its terminology in detail, while
we refer to previous works, studies or technical papers from Underwood and
Böhme et al.[45, 12] or from Nakamoto and Wood [35, 11].
1.2 Problem Statement
The most urgent concerns in the blockchains are related to scalability, perfor-
mance and a profit optimization for the participant in the system. In 2015,
Möser and Böhme [34] said that Bitcoin may not be as cheap for consumers as
it appears, and that Bitcoin users are encouraged to pay fees to miners up to 10
United States Dollar (usd)cents, per transaction, irrespectively to the amount
paid. Already in 2015, Rizun [40] wrote that the block size limit was set at
one mb, corresponding roughly to three transactions per second. Today the
transaction rate is over three hundred times larger than when the block size
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limit was introduced, hence increasing the block size limit is now being seri-
ously considered. In 2016 Croman et al. [14] announced that the current trend
of increasing the block sizes on Bitcoin portends a potential problem where
the system will reach its maximum capacity to clear transactions, probably by
2017. These problems need to be taken into consideration.
In this thesis we propose a longitudinal study on Bitcoin blockchain, analyzing
most recent data. In particular, we discuss the scalability of the blockchain,
how it affects the throughput, and we present performance observations of
the Bitcoin blockchain, analyzed with a blockchain analytic system developed
for this purpose. We provide detailed insights and analysis of how the char-
acteristics of Bitcoin, such as fee, block size, reward to different miners have
changed over time, and provide an updated view from the one proposed by
Möser and Böhme [34]. Furthermore, we analyze the correlation between the
fee paid from a transaction and its latency, or the time it takes to become visible
in the whole network. Three different models are proposed to describe how
applications should spend money to improve network performance, this affects
average bandwidth available to an application. By doing transaction-wise and
block-wise experiments and analyses on the Bitcoin blockchain we state and





Scalability andnetwork performances are urgent concerns in existing blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies [14]. According to Buterin et al. [11], if Bitcoin would
have the same amount of transactions as a VISA circuit, its blockchain would
grow about 1mb every 3 seconds, ∼28 gigabyte (gb) per day, instead of the
actual growth of ∼0.12gb per day. In this thesis we discuss how much scal-
ability affects centralization in the Bitcoin network and how its impact will
be in a couple of years. Furthermore, with our analysis we aim to study how
this growth is affecting the system’s performance and costs, and how much
they change if the system capacity is filled with too many transactions to
approve.
1.2.2 Performance
Centralized schemes, like VISA, are immediate while having a throughput of
two thousand transactions per second up to fifty-six thousand transactions per
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second [14]. It is true that Bitcoin has lower fees than centralized currency
schemes, but these properties come at a performance and scalability costs. In
the paper from Croman et al. [14], they claim that Bitcoin achieve a throughput
of 7 transactions per second constrained by the block creation time and the
block size limit. In this thesis we want to analyze the network performance
with new data from 2017 with regards to throughput and transactional latency
to see how much a possible change in the block size or block creation time
might influence the efficiency of the system.
1.2.3 Costs/Fees
Bitcoin’s strength has always been its lower fees if compared to centralized
systems. We aim to find out whether this it still true today or not, if the fees are
still low and the system still that cheap. The actual costs of the system have not
been extensively studied yet and Bitcoin might not be as cheap for costumers
as it appears. During our analysis we could observe a remarkable increase of
the fee paid from users. In this thesis we aim to find and prove the reasons
that leaded to this scenario and they involve also scalability and performance
problems. Our first concern while studying fees and tolls is to analyze whether
is possible or not for applications to control available bandwidth given from
the system by paying higher fees to miners.
1.3 Method / Context
To analyze performance, make assumptions on scalability and fees in the
Bitcoin network, data need to be retrieved from a source. We define three
different approaches of data retrieval and all three have their advantages and
disadvantages:
1. Real time analysis: It might be done by sniffing the traffic on the Bitcoin
network in order to get real time data. For this analysis at least one
full operating node needs to be implemented in the Bitcoin network.
Advantages are that, if you set two or more nodes distributed around
the world, you can get a lot of useful information regarding the inner-
node communication (otherwise impossible to obtain) and the block
propagation time plus the orphaning rate in the system. Disadvantages
are that you need a relevant disk space to download the full ledger of data
and the set up it extremely time consuming, plus, you have physical and
geographical limitations in order to get up and running multiple nodes
in different part of the world, without considering bandwidth restrictions
and electricity costs related to it.
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2. Historical data retrieval through Bitcoin Core: Another solution might
be to use the client app of Bitcoin, Bitcoin Core [46]. You can set up your
node containing the full ledger locally, storing all the necessary data
and have a historical view of the entire blockchain. Advantages are that
you have the whole view of the system. Disadvantages are that, this
whole view, still does not include the propagation time nor any miner’s
information, having to retrieve these knowledge separately. Plus, to set
up the full node might take up to 4 days and the disk space required is
in the order of hundreds of gb.
3. Historical data retrieval through Application Programming Inter-
face (api): Third choice is to build a system locally, and use Bitcoin
apis to gather data and generate information using those. Advantages
are that you have more flexibility when retrieving data, allowing you to
store only useful information, saving a considerable disk space, also, the
blockchain might be stored in intervals, which gives a faster retrieval,
more disk space saved and still provides enough information to have a
whole view of the system. Disadvantages are that still you don’t have
information about block propagation time and orphaning rate, and it
might be difficult to analyze the blockchain in real time.
In this thesis we use method 3, as this enables us to analyze a considerable
part of the blockchain with little up-front investment in computational re-
sources. A similar methodology was also adapted in the 2015 study by Möser
and Böhme [34], analyzing tips and tolls in the Bitcoin blockchain, collecting
data until 2014 and then analyzing more than nine million of transactions.
Since then, the rate of transactions have risen considerably from one hundred
thousand per day to three hundred fifty thousand per day, so the retrieving
part turned out to be more time consuming than expected. Despite that, we
aim to collect even a larger portion of the blockchain, storing data smartly
in a data frame, which allows us to save up to 10 times the amount of disk
space the blockchain actually requires. Then we analyze our collected data and
with machine learning techniques we define models, discuss about the results
and how much they can be reliable in a future-wise implementation. In our
data structure we store more than one hundred twenty million of transactions
occurred between April 2013 and September 2017. We used for the informa-
tion retrieval, apis from blockchain.info, combined with a HyperText Markup
Language (html) parsing on the same website for the information missing
while retrieving data with Bitcoin’s apis. Our assumption is that we can get
enough information about the Bitcoin blockchain by retrieving and analyzing
only a portion of the blockchain, but having in that way a finer granularity
than data represented on the Bitcoin website. In that way we aim to gain
more information out of it. Moreover, sampling data from a single node in the
blockchain gives statistics representative of the whole system.
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1.4 Outline
This chapter gives a briefly introduction about digital currencies, centralized
and decentralized systems, and it talks about the emerging of cryptocurrencies.
It also focuses to give a short introduction to the blockchain protocol and why it
is so important in systems such as Bitcoin. Chapter 2 helps the reader to under-
stand decentralized cryptocurrencies, focusing on mining and proof-of-work
concepts. It also gives an overall view about previous works and analyses on
the Bitcoin blockchain, and it shortly introduce the reader to machine learning
techniques about big data management. Chapter 3 talks about the system
we have developed for the blockchain analysis, it illustrates its architecture
and structure regarding data retrieval, manipulation and visualization. Fur-
thermore, assumptions that need to be proved in this thesis are defined. In
Chapter 4 we show our results. We explain the generated plots and prove our
assumptions, thereby we can discuss possible solutions of the problems raised.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and discussions of the overall work,





This chapter gives an introduction to blockchain systems,with a particular focus
on Bitcoin. We will briefly explain the concept of mining and introduce the
notion of payments and fees in the Bitcoin system. We will describe howminers
profit from mining, how a user could choose whether including fee or not in its
transactions, and how performance and scalability are changing the wayminers
select transactions. We will also describe some machine learning techniques
and data structures, plus we will take into consideration the most relevant
studies andworks that has been done in the Bitcoin system regarding scalability,
performance and fees. The list of symbols used is shown in Appendix B. For
further detail we refer to already existing high-level [12] or technical [53, 32,
33, 40, 35, 11] descriptions.
Differences between centralized and decentralized digital currencies are sum-
marized in Table 2.1. As mentioned in Chapter 1, more decentralized digital
currencies are emerging nowadays, and they aim to facilitate transactions
between consenting individuals who would otherwise have no means to trust
each other and deal with geographical separation and interfacing difficulties.
According to Nakamoto [35] an electronic coin is defined as follows:
The Definition 1. An eletronic coin is a chain of digital signatures. Each
owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the
previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding
these to the end of the coin.
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Table 2.1: Centralized vs Decentralized digital currencies
Centralized Decentralized
Under the control of a central au-
thority
Requires consensus among users to
make changes
Users depend on the control given
from the Certificate Authority (ca)
Users have full control over their as-
sets/data
No need to enforce cryptography or
to create keys
User’s data is uniquely identified by
their private key
Only users allowed by ca can partic-
ipate
Anyone can join and use the ledger
Historic transactions can be
changed by the ca
Historic transactions are unalterable
and permanent
Can be run very efficiently using re-
lational databases that fit the need
of the applications
Inefficient for the cost of mining
Transactions are registered in blocks, and all these systems use the blockchain
technology to maintain a serial order of them. The blockchain is a consensus
protocol that users run to maintain and secure a shared ledger of data and it
is formed of all blocks, ordered by time and linked between each other with
the previous block attribute. A transaction is approved only when it is included
in a block, and the miner including this transaction is the one who has first
solved the proof-of-work. Difficulty of proof-of-work is increased according to
keep an average T of 10minutes.
2.1 Mining
In a decentralized cryptocurrency network, transactions need to be approved
by all the participant before being validated and confirmed. This validation
requires high computational time and it is expensive in matter of electricity
and resources used.
The Definition 2. Mining is how transactions are validated and confirmed
by the network.
To validate and confirm transactions, the network needs miners. According to
the Bitcoin miner document [4], Bitcoin miners create new blocks from solving
a proof-of-work problem that is chained through cryptographic proof of the
previous block. The work and the effort spent to create new blocks is often
referred to as mining [4]. The mining process involves identifying a value that
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when hashed twice with SHA-256, begins with a number of zero bits. If the
amount of zeros needed for the creation is raised, the average work required
increases exponentially, while a hash can always be verified by executing a
single round of double SHA-256 [4, 42]. Each miner chooses whether to include
a transaction into a block or not, and we believe that nowadays this inclusion
strongly depends on the fee that this transaction has to offer. The first miner
who solves the proof-of-work gains the sum of the fees (tf ) offered by each
transaction included in the block, M , plus the block reward, R, which is now
set to 12.5B. When a new block is mined, that information is spread through
the whole network and if the solution is propagated to 50%+1 of the nodes in
the system, the block is validated and all the transactions in it are accepted and
confirmed. Finally, miners in the network express their acceptance by starting
to work on the next block, incorporating the hash of the newly accepted
one.
2.1.1 Proof-of-Work
Karpelès et all. define the proof-of-work as follows [25]:
The Definition 3. Proof-of-work is a piece of data which is difficult (costly
and time-consuming) to produce but easy for others to verify and which
satisfies certain requirements.
Mining a block is difficult because the SHA-256 [42] hash of a block’s header
must be lower or equal to a certain target value in order for the block to be
accepted by the network. Producing proof-of-work is a random process with
low probability of hitting the target value, so that a lot of trial and error is
required on average before a valid proof-of-work is generated. For example,
Hashcash is a proof-of-work system used to limit email spam and denial-of-
service attack and recently has become known for its use in Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies as part of the mining algorithm [7].
Figure 2.1: Diagram that shows how proof-of-work works.
Proof-of-work is a part of the mining process and a valid proof-of-work is
determined by incrementing a nonce until a value is found that gives the block’s
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hash the required number of leading zero bits. Once the hashing has produced
a valid result, the block is immutable and cannot be changed without rebuilding
a chain bigger than the original. As later blocks are appended to the chain, the
work to change the block would include redoing the work for each subsequent
block [4]. The best chain is the longest one, so is the one that requires the
greatest effort to produce, and majority consensus in Bitcoin is represented by
this chain. In this way if the majority of the computing power is controlled by
honest nodes, the honest chain will grow fastest and outpace any competing
chains. Diagram in Figure 2.1 represents how the proof-of-work is performed,
and it is inspired to the model presented in bitcoinmining.com [32].
2.1.2 Miners & Mining Pools
With paper money, a government decides when to print and distribute money.
Bitcoin does not have a central government and it uses a special software
to solve math problems to get a certain amount of coins in exchange. This
provides a smart way to issue the currency.
The Definition 4. A miner is a computer specifically designed to solve
problems according to the proof-of-work algorithm and they are required
to approve transactions.
Since miners are required to approve transactions, more miners mean a more
secure network. To become a Bitcoin miner nowadays, you need to buy highly
specified chips called Application Specific Integrated Circuits (asic). Informa-
tion about this hardware can be found at bitcoinmining.com [32]. In the early
days of Bitcoin (2009-2013) it was possible to mine with your commodity hard-
ware or high speed video processor card. Today that is no longer possible since
custom Bitcoin asic chips offer performance up to 100 times the capability of
older systems [32]. Another reason is that mining pools became more prevalent,
yielding a constant growth of the mining difficulty.
The Definition 5. A pooled mining combines the work of many miners
toward a common goal.
Pools of miners or mining pools find solutions faster than individual members
and each miner is rewarded proportionally with the amount of work it provides.
Mining is an important and integral part of Bitcoin that ensures fairness while
keeping the Bitcoin network stable, safe and secure [32].
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2.2 Reward & Fee
Miners generate new blocks by appending transactions to them. Every miner
has a mempool, N , containing the new, unapproved, n transactions, and they
get compensated for mining with a revenue 〈V 〉 = R + M , where M is the
sum of transaction fees in the block and R is the block reward, which is now
set at 12.5B. Miners are free to choose whether to accept or refuse a certain
transaction t ∈ N . Competitive miners will include transactions as long as the
fee exceeds the marginal cost of inclusion. Production costs are fixed per block
(but may vary between miners depending on access to technology and energy
cooling) and the protocol defines a maximum block sizeQ . Because of that, the
marginal cost of inclusion is zero if there are fewer unconfirmed transactions
than the capacity left in the block. Competitive miners make positive expected
profits only if transactions compete for space in the blockchain. Houy [21] argues
that a maximum block size is necessary for the stability of Bitcoin. However
in that way big mining pools might take advantage from less competition,
having a centralization problem, since a transaction is willing to compete only
if the capacity is reached. In that way if the system never reaches the capacity,
raising the fee will not be helpful at all. Before 2015, transactions almost never
required to compete for space in blocks, since the demand was less then the
offer, but nowadays we have a totally different scenario. In 2012, the number of
transactions confirmed per day reached peaks of fifty thousand,with an average
of fifteen thousand transactions per day [33]. Today we have an average of two
hundred fifty thousand transactions approved every day, with peaks of three
hundred and fifty thousand. Because of throughput limitations in the system,
caused by the block size limit, Q , set at 1mb and the average block creation
time, T , set at 10minutes, with such big scale of transactions that need to be
approved every day, miners could start to choose transactions with a higher fee
density ρ, or simply transactions that are willing to offer a higher fee rather
than 0-fee transactions. The fact that the reward R has a 50% reduction every
two hundred thousand blocks creates the need of a market mechanism to find
the price of Bitcoin transactions.
2.3 Previous Works
Themain problems analyzed in the past years concerning the Bitcoin blockchain
were related to scalability [40, 14], performance [14, 17] and costs/fees [40,
34]. Already in 2014 researchers believed that these "fees" users were paying
to miners were supposed to substitute miners’ minting reward in the long
run [34]. In 2015 discussions about how a rational Bitcoin miner should select
transactions from his nodemempool raised,and ideas aboutmaximizingminers’
profit when creating a new block emerged. Equations that aim to calculate the
14 CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND
cost of mining 〈C〉 and the miner’s profit 〈Π〉 were presented by Rizun [40]
and the concept of orphaning was introduced. as well Scalability is still a huge
concern, causing relevant bottlenecks in Bitcoin which limits the ability of the
current p2p overlay network to support substantially higher throughputs and
lower latencies [14].
2.3.1 A Transaction Fee Market Exists Without a Block Size
Limit
A pressing concern exists over the ramifications of changing (or not) a Bitcoin
protocol rule called block size limit. This rule sets an upper bound on the
network’s transactional capacity, or throughput (γ ). The limit is currently set
to 1mb, corresponding roughly to three transactions per second. This limit set
by the blockchain protocol, allow miners to include up to 1mb of transactions
selected from their mempools. When this limit was set, it was over eight
hundred times greater than what was required. However in 2015, blocks were
filled near the capacity and users experienced delays. In 2015 the transaction
rate was over three hundred times larger than when the block size limit was
introduced. To improve performance the block size limit should be raised, but in
that way transactions will not compete anymore for space in the block, creating
an unhealthy transaction fee market. Miners should then include transactions
in a manner that maximizes their expected profit [40]. For that reason Miner’s
Profit Equation, Mempool Demand Curve, Block Space Supply Curve and the
concept of fee density were introduced. Every time a block is mined, the miner
expects to generate a revenue 〈V 〉 at hashing cost 〈C〉, yielding a profit 〈Π〉 as
follows:
〈Π〉 = 〈V 〉 − 〈C〉. (2.1)
where the hashing cost is represented by:
〈C〉 = ηhT . (2.2)
So the hashing cost 〈C〉 is directly dependent on the miner’s individual hash
rate, h, the cost per hash, η, and the creation time, T . The revenue 〈V 〉 is
calculated with the amount he would earn if he won the block (reward plus
fees, R +M) multiplied by his probability of winning (ratio between miner’s
hash rate, h, and hash rate of the Bitcoin network, H), considering also the
orphaning rate presented in Equation 2.4.
The Definition 6. A block B1 generated at a timestamp t1 is orphan if it does
not get approved by the network because another block B2 with a greater
timestamp t2 > t1 which propagates faster, gets approved instead.
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So the expected revenue is shown in Equation 2.3:






Where Porphan increases with the amount of time a block takes to propagate
throughnetwork. Ifτ is the block propagation time, the probability of orphaning
is defined as:
Porphan = 1 − e
− τ
T . (2.4)
We can now define the miner profit equation as follows:




T − ηhT . (2.5)
A rational miner selects which transactions to include in his block in a manner
that maximizes the expectation value of his profit. This selection is explained
with theMempool Demand Curve and the Block Space Supply Curve. According
to the size limit, a block can select a b ≤ n transactions from N to create a
new block B ⊂ N .
Studies on inclusion came to the conclusion that a block first includes transac-
tions with a higher fee density, ρ, which is the ratio between the transaction
fee, tf , and the transaction size, tq . To construct the mempool demand curve,
the mempool must be sorted from greatest fee density to least and its formula




tf i , (2.6)





The mempool demand curve represents then the maximum fee,Mdemand (b) a
miner can claim by producing a given quantity Q(b) of block space. The size
of the block a miner elects to produce controls the fees he attempts to claim,
M(Q), and the propagation time he chooses to risk, τ (Q). The block space
supply curve represents the fees a miner requires to cover the additional cost of
supplying block space Q . This cost grows exponentially with the propagation








where ∆τ (Q) ≡ τ (Q)−τ (0). In order to have a transaction fee market without a
block size limit, to maximize his profit, theminer constructs a mempool demand
curve and a space supply curve. The block size Q∗ where the miner’s surplus,
Mdemand −Msupply , is largest represents the point of maximum profit.
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2.3.2 Trends, Tips and Tolls
The Bitcoin protocol supports direct payments from transaction partners to
miners, also called fees (tf ). Acknowledging their role in stabilizing of the
system, the right level of transaction fees is a hot topic of normative debate.
The actual costs of the system are not extensively studied and Bitcoin may
not be as cheap for consumers as it appears. The definition of transaction
fee is encoded as difference between the sum of all inputs and the sum of
all outputs of a transaction (Equation 3.3). Previous analyses on the Bitcoin
blockchain such as the one presented by Möser and Böhme in 2015 [34], show
that transaction fees are lower than 0.1% of the transmitted value, which is
significantly below the fees charged by conventional payment systems, and at
the time of analysis the hard size limit did not (yet) significantly drive the
level of transaction fees. However trends for the fees paid per transaction over
time noticeably changed. The trend of 0-fee transactions had a drop after
April 2012 leaving space to 0.0005B fee until May 2013. After that, until
the beginning of 2015 the trend for fees was of 0.0001B and 0.0002B, with
peaks of 0.001B. Generally, there seem to be two main reasons for the shift
in trends: changes to the Bitcoin reference implementation and actions by
large intermediaries in the ecosystem. The emergence of 0.0005B fees in June
2011 can be mapped to the release of version 0.3.23 of the Bitcoin Core client,
which reduced the default transaction fee from 0.01B to 0.0005B. The raise
of these last transaction fees in the second quarter of 2012 was probably due
to the launch of the gambling website SatoshiDice [51]. In May 2013, version
0.8.2 of Bitcoin Core was released. In the past years, during a period between
2011 and 2015 there was a small share of transactions that did not offer
fee to miners, most of them offered default fee amount but some of them
were even willing to pay a higher fee, a tip. A plausible reason is that paying
more fee led to a faster confirmation. Analysis on the blockchain in 2015 [34]
state that half of all 0-fee transactions had to wait more than 20minuets for
their first confirmation. In contrast to that, paying a 0.0005B fee lead to an
inclusion into a block in half the time. 10% of all 0-fee transactions took
almost 4hours to confirm, in contrast to 40minutes for transactions paying a
0.0005B fee. The difference between paying 0.0005B or 0.001B fee is not as
pronounced,but the difference inmedians are still statistically and economically
significant. Analysis on pool behavior regarding a possible systematic exclusion
of 0-fee transactions has been done. Shares have shifted between pools quite
extensively. In 2013, BTC Guild had a market share of up to 40%, in 2014
both GHash.IO and Discus Fish ousted this pool. Also, the share of other
pools has rose in 2014. Previous incumbents like Slush or 50BTC have lost
popularity. Possible reasons include economic and technical factors, like pool
fees, service availability, or robustness against attacks. Given the dominance
of a few mining pools, evaluations whether some pools systematically enforce
fees has been made. The results show that two pools, Discus Fish and Eligius,
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have a considerably higher share of blocks without any 0-fee transaction, with
30.6% for Eligius and 62.5% for Discus Fish, in contrast to an average of 14.4%.
Other than that though, there is no clear evidence for enforcement of strictly
positive transactions fees.
2.3.3 Bitcoin Performance Limitation
Can decentralized blockchains be scaled up to match the performance of a
mainstream payment processor? What does it take to get there? In 2016 the
Bitcoin blockchain took 10minutes or longer to confirm transactions, achiev-
ing 7 transactions per second maximum throughput. Visa credit card confirms
a transaction within seconds and processes two thousand transactions per
second on average with peaks of fifty-six thousand transactions per second.
Bitcoin community has put forth various proposals to modify the key systems
parameters of block size and block interval. Anyway, Croman et al. state that
such scaling by reparametrization can achieve only limited benefits [14]. This
is because because Bitcoin generates a lot of network traffic, due to its de-
centralization, this leads to have a lot of peers in the network and they all
have to interact. To ensure that most of the nodes in the overlay network have
sufficient throughput we follow two guidelines:
• Throughput limit. The block size should not exceed4mb given 10minutes
average block interval. Corresponding to maximum 27 transactions per
second.
• Latency limit. The block interval should not be smaller than 12 seconds.
The maximum throughput of 3-7 transactions per second is a number con-
strained by the 1mb block size Q and the 10minutes creation time T . About
the propagation time τ , measured in 2016 [14] shows that 10%, 50% and 90%
block propagation times are 0.8 seconds, 8.7 seconds and 79 seconds respec-
tively, with an average block size of 540 kilobyte (kb). Projecting to a 1mb
block size, τ would be 2.4min, 15.7 sec, and 1.5 sec respectively. In that way
an effective throughput on the network could be calculated as follows:
X% effective throughput = Q/(X% block propagation delay).
Havingwith X = 50%, an effective throughput of 496Kbps, equals to 248 tx/sec,
and with X = 90%, an effective throughput of 55Kbps, equals to 26 tx/sec. It




Consequently, for a 10minute (or shorter) block interval, the block size should
not exceed 4mb for X = 90%; and 38mb for X = 50%, corresponding to a
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throughput of at most 27 transactions per second. To improve the system’s
latency it could be enough to reduce the block interval. To maintain effective
throughput would also require a reduction in the block size. Propagating a
block smaller than 80kb would not make full use of the network’s bandwidth,
as latency would still be a significant factor in the block’s propagation time.
Propagating an 80kb block to 90% of the nodes would take roughly 12 seconds.
In conclusion, to retain at least 90% effective throughput and fully utilize
the bandwidth of the network, the block interval should not be smaller than
12 seconds.
2.4 Machine Learning
When a new node joins the Bitcoin network, it has to download all the useful
information to process transactions and verify them. This information consist
of a relevant quantity of data, nowadays ∼125gb, and it grows continuously
over time. A full node might require more than four days to download the entire
ledger. Once all the data are collected, is necessary to implement a way to
store them and to get the right information out of them. Many data structures
allow the storing of big datasets, and several machine learning techniques
grant to infer more information out of them. While applying machine learning
techniques to big datasets might be recommended to use data structures such
as trees or data frames which are more likely to be used in machine learning
algorithms.
2.4.1 Training Dataset
Having a huge dataset implies having a big amount of data with different types
of attributes. These attributes might have numerical or categorical values.
Numerical: Data that can be measured, quantified. For example the fee tf
paid to a miner in Bitcoin Currency (btc).
Categorical: Data which represent characteristics. For example the name of
the miners in the Bitcoin system.
These data might be saved in a data structure such as a data frame, having
a sample for each row and different attributes of that particular sample on
every column. Once data are collected, they might be trained to create predict-
ing models or other useful material. Training and predicting models involve
different types of variables:
Target variables: the variable that you are attempting to predict, represented
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with Y ;
Predictors: variables that you can use to make the prediction, repre-
sented with X .
X =

x11 x12 . . . x1n















When the targets are real numbers, the problem with training those data is
called regression problem. If the targets are two-valued the problem is called
binary classification problem. We then need to predict every yi ∈ Y using each
rowxi ∈ X and evaluate the performance of our predictions. Good performance
means using the attributes xi to generate a prediction that is close to yi . For
a regression problem where yi is a real number, performance is measured in
terms like the mean squared error (mse) (Equation 2.11) or the mean absolute












|(yi − pred(xi ))| (2.12)
However, since mse is in squared units, the Root Mean Square Error (rmse)
is usually a more usable number to calculate. If the problem is a classification
problem, then other measures of performance must be used. One of the most
used is the misclassification error. Classification problems generally revolve
around misclassification error rates and, usually, algorithms for such kind of
problems can present predictions in the form of a probability rate for the
attributes rather than an attribute itself.
Before and during the analysis we made assumptions about how attributes and
values might change if other attributes were increased or decreased. These
assumptions are shown in Table 3.2. To be able to see whether an attribute is
related to another we might measure it by using Pearson’s correlation. Pearson’s
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First subtract the mean value of u from all the elements of u, and the same


















The Pearson’s correlation between u and v is defined as follows in Equa-
tion 2.15 [9]:
corr (u,v) = ∆u
T × ∆v√(∆uT × ∆u) × (∆vT × ∆v) (2.15)
2.4.2 Pandas Data Frame
In machine learning is important to pick one data structure and store your
data in it for the analysis and testing. We focus on explain Pandas data
frame [6] since is the data structure we chose for this thesis. Pandas is a Python
package providing fast, flexible, and expressive data structures designed to
makeworking with “relational” or “labeled” data both easy and intuitive. It aims
to be the fundamental high-level building block for doing practical, real world
data analysis in Python. One of the primary data structure that Pandas provides
is DataFrame. A data frame is a two-dimensional size-mutable, potentially
heterogeneous tabular data structure with labeled axes (rows and columns).
Arithmetic operations align on both row and column labels [6]. In our case
each sample is a transaction T , and if we consider a data frame D like a set
created from the union of allm transactions retrieved,D = {T1∪T2∪· · ·∪Tm},









Now, if every transactionT has n attribute,T = {a1,a2, . . . ,an}, we can finally
represent our data frame as follows:
D =

a11 a12 . . . a1n





am1 am2 . . . amn

(2.17)
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Furthermore, operations such as groupby,mean,median, sum are wellmanaged
in Pandas data frame, making it easy to manage your data. In Appendix C
code for these operations is shown. This is just a theoretical explanation of
data frame and we focus on a practical explanation on our data structure in
Chapter 3.2.2.
2.4.3 Visualizing Data
When analyzing big datasets, finding a smooth and nice way of representing
information of them might be tricky. For example, if you have millions or
billions of samples it will result almost impossible to get any information by
simply plotting these data. When analyzing longitudinal data for example,
information might be shown daily, monthly or even yearly-wise, then the mean
for every portion is applied. However, bigger is the dataset and most likely it
will contain outliers. In this case, calculating the mean on those data might
be misleading, that is why in a longitudinal study should also be considered
whether to apply a median value for every portion rather than the mean, since





To understand digital cryptocurrencies, in particular Bitcoin, and to study
existing systems, a complete data analytics system, bas, was designed and
implemented. The system retrieves information from different sources, writes
it into a local data structure and then analyzes data by generating and plotting
new information. Using this system, we were able to run a longitudinal study
on the Bitcoin blockchain, collecting useful information from 2014 to 2017,
analyzing more than one hundred twenty million of transactions, which corre-
sponds to about half of the blockchain for that period. Previous studies [34, 17]
did not analyze such large portion of the blockchain. Using BAS, such studies
can be conducted more easily and be scaled up. We believe this is essential for
understanding cryptocurrencies in the wild.
This chapter details our experimental setup and explains how our studies on
the Bitcoin blockchain took place, clarifying how we analyzed the apis from
blockchain.info to get the best information out of them. We illustrate also
how we collected and then manipulated our data, describing how we plotted
our data and why. In Chapter 4 again, we point out our solutions compared to
our assumptions and our conclusions.
As mentioned in Chapter 1.3 we opted for building a small data analytics system
locally rather than using Bitcoin Core client or running full nodes in the Bitcoin
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network. By doing that we had the freedom and the flexibility to retrieve and
store only the information we needed for our purpose, and considering how
much the blockchain scales it turned out to be one of the most valid points.
Furthermore, we thought that the effort for setting up one or more nodes in
the system was far above than the benefits we would have gained. It would
have only allowed us to have a better estimation of the block propagation
time, hence we are using the one evaluated first in 2013 by Decker et al. and
then in 2015 from Croman et al. [17, 14], and we can consider them reliable
enough for the purpose of our work. Plus, from the beginning we excluded the
idea of using Bitcoin Core, since it forces you to download, keep, and update
the ledger of data, without providing information about propagation time nor
miners.
3.1 System Architecture
bas architecture is shown in Figure 3.1. Information coming from the Bit-
coin network is collected in databases and web services such as blockchain.
info [33] or coindesk.com [2]. We use their web services, REpresentational
State Transfer (rest) apis and HTTP parsing to get this information. Our
system then collects and gathers data locally and saves it in our data frame D.
After that data are ready to be trained and plotted.
Figure 3.1: Architecture of bas.
As Figure 3.2 shows, the information retrieval works in a combined way, block-
wise and transaction-wise, information gathered from both sources are written
and stored in D. bas collects information from:
1. JavaScript Object Notation (json) file sources: files processed block
by block and for each block transaction by transaction, then information
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are added to D.
2. html file sources: files obtained via a HTTP request. The parsed infor-










Figure 3.2: How information is retrieved and gathered in our data frame D.
3.2 Data Sources
Manywebsites like tradeblock.com [41] or blockchain.info [33] are observing
the Bitcoin blockchain every day. These websites also provide a remote api
that allows you to retrieve information about blocks and transactions directly
from the website through rest apis. Furthermore, websites like coinbase.com
provide useful information about the money exchange price, and they arrange
api along with libraries like the one we used, called forex-python [27]. As
already mentioned, one of the most popular system for analyzing Bitcoin data
is Bitcoin Core [46]. However, the client requires users to download the full
ledger of data before any analytics can take place, which at the time of writing
was 125gb, with a total disk space required of 250gb. Since we wanted to
optimize and be able to select data we wished to analyze and did not have
the need to run a full node, we developed a system for blockchain retrieval
and analysis. This system allows to fetch a portion of the blockchain by storing
data in Pandas data frame [6]. This allows saving one order of magnitude
of disk space while still storing all the information needed for our purpose.
Finally, the system displays all the knowledge acquired, analyzing data and
applying machine learning techniques on those, using Python libraries such as
matplotlib [22] and seaborn [52]. Even though we know Python is not known
for its computational speed, it provides nice access to the Bitcoin blockchain
by using apis arranged by blockchain.info, allowing the retrieval of all the
information stored in a block and transaction, plus, its enormous amount of
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Coindesk.com Price usd and B value
Data frame D Block, Transaction,
Miner, Price
τ , tf , tl , γ , ρ, t%
libraries grants a vast flexibility on which machine learning algorithms can be
applied or which plotting system to use.
3.2.1 Data Retrieval
The architecture displayed in Figure 3.1 gives information about the different
data gathered in our system. The system imports Bitcoin apis and uses them
for data retrieval. The website blockchain.info also provides rest apis, in
that way requests made to a resource’s Universal Resource Identifier (uri) will
elicit a response that may be in eXtensible Markup Language (xml), html,
json or some other defined format. In our case, rest apis from Bitcoin
return json data. The website blockchain.info is monitoring the blockchain
24-7, producing graphs and statistical analysis on the actual Bitcoin network.
The local application is monitoring these data as well, producing graphs that
are not taken into consideration from this website, using a finer granularity
to represents the data, allowing us to do an in-depth analysis on those. For
our analysis we select a time range from April 2013 to September 2017,
considering more than one hundred twenty million of transactions and one
hundred thousand of blocks. Before 2013, analyses on the system were already
performed and evaluated [14, 21, 34, 40] plus the popularity of the system
before 2011 was low and interpreting this early data would not be useful and
might even be self-defeating in order to understand system’s behavior. To have
an overall view of the entire Bitcoin network we combine data from different
sources. As Table 3.1 shows, we use both blockchain.info apis and HTTP
parsing to gather information about blocks, transactions and miners, plus we
used coindesk.com apis [2, 27] to gain information about the pricing of usd
and B. Unfortunately apis from blockchain.info do not allow us to retrieve
all the information we need, knowledge regarding miners is not included in
the blockchain, so we need to get this information by parsing web pages on
blockchain.info. Finally, additional useful information and derived data such
as throughput γ or transaction fee tf are obtained using our data structure
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D (Chapter 3.2.2), containing both, this new information and the previously
collected ones. An example of data retrieval is shown in Appendix C.6 and the
retrieved block and transaction structures by using restful apis is shown in
Appendix C.7, C.8.
First idea, Blockchain Splitted in Portions
During our analysis we evaluate different possible ways to retrieve data. Be-
cause of its relevant size and its fast growth, we considered the blockchain as
an object and we thought that analyzing different portions over time following
a certain pattern would give us an accurate summary of the whole system.
We started retrieving data by dividing the blockchain in k portions. Suppose
now that m is the last block’s height, then we divide all in k portions, hav-
ing p = m/k. While retrieving b blocks, they are retrieved and stored in the
following way:
〈1 . . .b〉, 〈p . . .p + b〉, 〈2p . . . 2p + b〉, . . . , 〈kp . . .kp + b〉.
Retrieving blocks in such portions gives statistical representation of the whole
system. Like Figure 3.3 shows, every new b blocks added to the blockchain will
be added to the indexes:
ip + b
{
for i = 0 to k . (3.1)
Retrieving data in this way reduce drastically the space requirements and yet
Figure 3.3: Science of Bitcoin blockchain, the entire blockchain considered as an
object and divided in k portions. One of the first attempts of data retrieval
on Bitcoin blockchain.
retaining information about the whole system. However, data collected using
these methods were not enough to achieve our target of longitudinal study
and analysis, but this technique gave us a spark for the next data retrieval
attempt.
Fragmented Blockchain
In the next approach, we use much smaller interval between each portion
retrieved, called jump or J . Plus we do not retrieve the earliest part of the
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blockchain, the one from 2009 to 2013. By retrieving 10 blocks each time,
according to the granularity of J we can have a more or less precise analysis.
To balance disk space and precision, we choose a J = 10 and a b = 10
blocks retrieved each time we performed bas. This means that every 10 blocks
retrieved, there was a jump of other10 blocks, corresponding to the∼50% of the
entire blockchain, daily analyzed. Figure 3.4 shows how our last data fetching
has been implemented, so D is generated accordingly, collecting transactions
happened in one hundred minutes and then having one hundred minutes of
gap. This method allowed us to collect relevant information from 2013 to 2017
by only using ∼25gb of disk space. Then, the pattern we have chosen to store
Figure 3.4: Fragmented blockchain divided in smaller portions with a jump of J blocks.
transactions is the following:
〈m . . .m−b〉, 〈m−b−J . . .m−2b−J 〉, . . . , 〈m−(k−1)b−(k−1)J . . .m−kb−(k−1)J 〉.
Andwe can write the indexes for each portion that has to be retrieved according
to Equation 3.2, following the format 〈start . . . end〉:
〈m − ib + b − k J + J . . .m − ib − i J + J 〉 {for i = 1 to k . (3.2)
Having m as the height of the most recent retrieved block and k number of
portions. An example of this retrieval method is shown in Appendix C.9.
3.2.2 Data Organization
Figure 3.2 shows how data, once retrieved, are collected and gathered in bas.
The Pandas package makes it possible to read data into a specialized data
structure called a data frame [6]. As argued by Michael Bowles [9], you can
think of a data frame as a table or matrix-like structure with a row representing
a single case or observation and columns representing particular attributes. We
decided to use a data frame structure and not a matrix because even though
the data frame structure is matrix-like, its elements in various columns may be
of different types. For statistical problems, the matrix is too confining because
statistical samples typically have a mix of different types, in addition, Pandas
package makes it possible to automate the steps to calculate mean, variance,
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median, group-by elements, and it offers a nice and smooth control over the
data.
Finally, once data are retrieved and collected, they are saved in a data frame
structure that we call D. Derived data such as γ or ρ, useful for the blockchain
analysis, are obtained using D. This data structure is divided among multiple
files with an overall size of ∼25gb and it contains both numerical and categori-
cal variables, saving an average of 5 times the amount of disk space compared to
the same information you get by downloading the full ledger, reaching peaks of
10 times for some blocks. In D, information is stored in a bi-dimensional table,
with transaction samples represented in rows and their attributes in columns.
If we consider a set of attributes as a transaction, T , and a set of transactions
D, then we have T = {a1,a2, . . . ,am} and Y = {T1 ∪T2 ∪ · · · ∪Tn}. Our data
frame D will have then a cardinality of |D| = (m × n) and it will be structured
as shown in Equation 2.17.
Once defining the structure for our dataset D, we consider a set T having the
following attributes (Appendix B):
T = {tha , tin, tou , tf , tq , t%, tl ,Q,T ,Bh ,Bepoch ,Bt ,Bha ,Bmi}.
We structure the way our data are stored in order to do subsequential sampling.
This is the reason why we stored transactions ordered by block and each block
ordered by height/epoch, in that way we have the dataset ordered by block
creation with all its transactions, making it easier to do analyses or sampling
data in a chronological order. Summarizing, our data frame allows us to collect
all the useful information without storing the whole raw blockchain like current
systems for blockchain analysis [46] do. Raw data are collected in json format,
analyzed, printed to our data frame and then deleted. This yielded up to save
10 times the amount of disk space, storing in a 1gb data frame what the
raw files from blockchain.info store in 10gb space. Plus, we believe that
analyzing a small percentage of the blockchain everyday will give us relevant
information about the whole system. Due to time limitations we could only
collect 50% of the data, every day.
3.2.3 Data Visualization
Once data are retrieved and saved in our data structure D, is finally possible
to get the information we need out of them. Even though Pandas offers a nice
way to plot your data, visualizing big data might be not always immediate or
intuitive, and a study on how to plot your data is necessary if you want to gain
the right information out of it. Once data are ready to be analyzed, the first step
is to determine the outliers. A spontaneous question that came up in our minds
is: how to deal with outliers? We could segregate them out and train on them
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as a separate class, or easier, when data are grouped, a median is calculated
instead of the mean, since mean is extremely sensitive to outliers. Dealing with
categorical attributes instead, as the number of attributes grows, the complexity
of handling them mounts, also, most of binary tree algorithms, which are the
basis for ensamble methods, have a cutoff on how many categories they can
manage [9]. Random Forest package written by Breiman and Cutler has a
cutoff of 32 categories [10]. Our only categorical variable is Bmi so we did not
deepen the analysis of categorical attributes.
To visualize ourdatawe use Pandas libraries as well asmatplotlib and seaborn [6,
22, 52]. We mostly use seaborn when we need to plot data according to
a certain category, so we need multiple samples for each (x ,y) point, e.g.
Figures 4.2, 4.8. We use it to calculate how major mining pools change their
number of transactions approved over time, or to calculated the ρ for every
mining pool. We also use it to calculate the linear regression and the Pearson’s
coefficient for every attribute a ∈ D. Pandas was used mainly for area plots
and pie plots, e.g. Figure 4.11, 4.12.
One example of data manipulation and visualization on our dataset D regards
to the calculation and classification over time of the fee density, ρ. From D,
we collected the data we needed and we generated another data frame D ′. In
that way we have a new data frame with a new set of attributes X ′, generated












−→ brings a new set of attributes with new data in it.
This new X ′ contains a set of numerical values categorized, regarding ρ, plus
the related date and the total number of transactions approved in the following
way:
X ′ = {0, <50, <100, <200, <300, >300, date, total}.
Another use of data manipulation for visualization is the one we apply to the
epoch. We want to make our data more readable and categorize the time, by
transforming our epoch in date time and then get only the information we
need regarding the day, the month or the year. By doing that we have to apply
a function to our data frame D that hits one attribute (in this case the epoch,
Bepoch), convert it to date and then parse it to get information about the day,
month or year. The listing is shown in Appendix C.5.
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3.2.4 Derived Data
As shown In Table 3.1, our data frame D gives us information about derived
data, from other data collected. This section aims to explain how they are
calculated and why they are so important. We first focus on calculating the
exact amount a transaction has to pay in order to get the payment processed
and approved: the transaction fee, tf . This fee is a difference between the sum
of all inputs tin and the sum of every output tou of a transaction t . In that
way, if n is the number of input andm the number of output, tf is calculated








Next, we calculate the time it takes for every transaction t , to be approved in the
network: transaction latency, tl . This value is calculated following Equation 3.4
and is the difference between two epochs, the first is the block creation time
in which a transaction t is included, the second is the transaction timestamp,
so when it was created. tl it could be measured in seconds, minutes or hours.
tl = Bepoch − tepoch . (3.4)
Another relevant derived information using D, is the throughput of the Bitcoin
network, or how many transactions it can approve per second. We measure it






As stated by Rizun [40], information regarding fee density might be of a
relevant interest. This value, that we represent with ρ, could be an important
factor for miners to chose whether to include a transaction or not in their next
block, and indicates how many btc(B) per bytes a transaction t has to offer.





We also calculate and insert in D the fee paid in percentage, compared it with
the total input of a transaction t . This value might be useful when the Bitcoin
price increases or decreases drastically, in a way that we are able to monitor if
the fee is stable, or changes over time. Then we calculated t% as it is shown in
Equation 3.7:
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Table 3.2: Possible Relations Between Major Attributes
Q T τ γ tf 〈C〉 Porphan tl
Q ↑ ↑↑ ↑ (↓) ↑ ↑↑ (↓)
T ↑ (↑) ↓ ↑
τ ↑ ↑↑ ↓ (↓) (↑) ↑↑ ↑
γ ↑ ↑ ↓ (↓) ↑ (↑) ↓
tf ↓ (↑) ↑ ↑
〈C〉 ↓ ↓ ↑ (↓)
Porphan ↓ ↓ ↓
1 ↑↑/↓↓: more than linear or even exponential increase/decrease
2 ↑/↓: increase/decrease.
3 (↑)/(↓): might increase/decrease.
The last derived data is the block propagation time, τ . The calculation of this
value follows the papers from Decker and Croman [17, 14]. From 2012 to 2015
block propagation time had an increment. When it was tested from Decker
and Wattenhofer in 2012 the median and 90-percentile time for Bitcoin nodes
to receive a block was 6.5 seconds and 26 seconds respectively. Considering
that at the time of their measurements, the average block size was 87kb, a
full 1mb block would have taken 5 minutes to be visible for 90% of the nodes
in the network. In 2015, the last measurements from Decker and Croman
showed that the 10%, median, and 90% block propagation times were 0.8
seconds, 8.7 seconds, and 79 seconds respectively. Further, the average block
size was at the time roughly 540kb. Projecting to a 1mb block size, the 90%,
median, and 10% block propagation times would be 2.4min, 15.7 sec, and
1.5 sec respectively. We consider this last measurement our reference for the
block propagation time τ .
3.3 Assumptions
Our focus and studies are related to blockchain scalability, performance and
to investigate whether the constant increase of transactions per day affects
the way miners include transactions or the way users offer fees to miners. We
assume that, analyzing the last 5 years of transactionsmight produce interesting
results about how this system is evolving and changing its properties, and how
this properties are related between each others. We studied and analyzed
previous works on the Bitcoin blockchain [14, 40, 34, 17] and we made some
assumptions of how the following properties of the Bitcoin systems may vary
if other attributes are changed as well. We tried to classify the main properties
of the system and make assumptions on how they may vary. These attributes
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areQ , T , τ , γ , tf , 〈C〉, Porphan and tl and our assumptions are summarized in
Table 3.2. For each property, the rows describe what happens to other attributes
if the attribute considered, is increased/decreased. White spaces means that
there might be no relation or we do not have any assumption yet. For example,
if we are going to increase the block space Q , then we have a relevant increase
of the propagation time, τ , the chances of orphaning are way bigger, so it will
be the cost of mining a block, but we have a better throughput γ , and we might
have less fee from transactions, tf , since they will have less competition while




In this chapter we present and discuss observations of the Bitcoin blockchain,
captured by the analytic system outlined in Chapter 3. To evaluate and discuss
our problem definition in Chapter 1.2, we focus on considerations related to
performance, scalability, fees and costs. To answer our questions and focus on
the problems and possible solutions, a large number of test has been evalu-
ated, more than one hundred twenty million transactions over one hundred
thousands blocks were collected, stored and analyzed, between April 2013 and
September 2017. Graphs and relations between attributes are represented and
discussed, and they mine to verify our assumptions in Table 3.2. We can finally
state that scalability brought to a centralization problem concerning miners,
since nowadays there are less individual miners and more mining pools, an
unlikely and ill-judged increment of T that might lead to an excessive high
throughput γ , and an urgent problem whether to increase the block size Q or
not, due to the massive scale of transactions to approve; performance studies
brought to consider carefully an increment of γ since it may leads either to a
raise in costs 〈C〉 or a growth of Porphan , while a user-side performance study
concerning the transaction latency tl , enhanced after 2015, tl became strictly
dependent of tf ; and finally a study on tips and tolls brought us to analyze
miner’s profits and users’ benefits, and thanks to our data collected we were
able to infer the miner profit function f 2〈Π〉, which establishes a relation between
a block creation time and a miner’s profit 〈Π〉, and to analyze how the fee paid
to the miner changed over time, studying also the fee density ρ.
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4.1 Scalability
Scalabilitymay concern the number of nodes in the network but also the amount
of transactions requested per second that the system faces. The constant growth
of cryptocurrencies popularity rise many concerns regarding the scalability
of the system. The reward for miners resulted in an increasing interest in
mining, and the number of nodes for this purpose highly increased during
years. From that, mining pools emerged to solve the puzzles faster and share
the earned reward afterwards. This creates a centralization problem though,
only bigger mining pools nowadays, such as AntPool [55], F2Pool [3], BTCC
Pool [1] or BitFury [50], will find a solution to mine new blocks, discouraging
a lot of small miners to join the network.
More scalability problems are related to the growing amount of transactions
that need to be approved every day. With an average tq of 500 bytes, a fixed
estimated T = 10 minutes and a maximum block size Q fixed at 1mb, the
outside number of transactions the system can approve per second is roughly
3-4 transactions per second. Compared to systems like VISA that can easily
approve two thousand transactions per second, Bitcoin or any other digital
cryptocurrency using the blockchain protocol are still far in taking over digital
systems such as VISA or Master Card. However we want to analyze these
boundaries and understand what it possible to do with regards to improving
scalability.
4.1.1 Miners & Mining Pools
In our data frame D, all the information regarding every single transaction
are stored, including which miner approved it. We analyzed and tracked down
every active miner in the system from 2013 to 2017. With 50% of the total
information we evaluate a total number of 6137 miners, of which 6066 are
just occasional nodes not belonging to any mining pool. Note that this number
is approximate to the number of active miners, and it counts every mining
pool as one, since mining pools withheld information about miners in their
systems. In Figure 4.1 the number of monthly active miners from 2013 until
now is displayed. Even if the number is relative to 50% of the blockchain, we
analyze every block mined over time and we state that after December 2014
until August 2015 there was a relevant drop, connected to the growth showed
in Figure 4.2, mainly caused by the come of mining pools, KnCMiner, AntPool
and BitFury in late 2014, and the massive mining power growth of SlushPool
and F2Pool in mid 2015. This is the main cause of the occasional miners’ drop
in the system, and more mining pools will join the network, more it will be
disheartening for smaller nodes to start mining, since the costs will be probably
higher than the revenue. This creates a sort of centralization problem, since
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Figure 4.1: Monthly number of active miners from 2013 to 2017.
only the biggest mining pools could take part in the whole process of approving
transactions, forcing small and occasional miners to join big mining pools. From
our analysis, we state that there are different mining pools joining and leaving
the Bitcoin network during these years. As Figure 4.2 shows, the most relevant
example is the GHash.IO pool, which was one of the major mining pool until
mid 2015, then its mining power started to decrease slowly until its end in
October 2016. We refer to an article from coindesk.com [20] which says that
Bitcoin miners ditched GHash.IO pool over fears of 51% attack (Appendix A).
Indeed in 2014, according to blockchain.info, GHash.IO accounted for more
than 42% of Bitcoin mining power. Nowadays as the Table 4.1 shows, AntPool
has 19.53% of the mining power, and there is no centralization risk. After that,
we analyzed the major mining pools from 2013 until 2017, dividing the time
period in two portions, 2013-2015 and 2016-2017, and selecting the first 10
miners regarding their mining power, as represented in Tables 4.2-4.1. Table 4.2,
shows that a big percentage of the mining power comes from occasional miners,
and for the whole period between 2013 and 2015 GHash.IO only had 13.3% of
share. We can see in Figure 4.2 that this mining pool only had a short time peak
between 2013-2015, but anyway in an overall scheme it managed to collect
13.3% of the whole share. Table 4.1 shows that AntPool, F2Pool and BTCC Pool
are dominating the mining power in the Bitcoin network from 2016 until now
with values respectively of 19.53%, 16.43% and 10.5% of share. If compared
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Figure 4.2: Top 15 mining pools from 2013 until 2017 and their trend according to
the number of transaction they approve every month.
with Table 4.2, AntPool is the one which is growing the fastest, andmining pools
such as GHash.IO and BTC Guild stopped their activity. We state that today, no
miner seems to get even close to the GHash.IO share in 2014 and it seems like
we will not have a centralization problem in the very near future. However,
the mining power over the years changed from a distributed architecture to
a decentralized one. We can see in Figure 4.3 that occasional miners almost
disappeared in the last two years, leaving space to mining pools in their absence,
while they were contributing for almost the 100% at the end of 2013. This
brought a downside for individual users that want to buy their own hardware
and start mining for themselves. Since Bitcoin always claimed its distribution
as a system strength, this scalability issue might result a centralization problem
in the long run, excluding small miners from the system and letting only the
biggest mining pools to have information about the whole blockchain. Bitcoin is
useful only if is decentralized because centralization requires trust and Bitcoin
value proposition is trustlessness.
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Table 4.1: Mining power distribution in a scenario from 2016 until 2017, considering
the 10 major mining pools.
Mining Pool Mining Power (%) Blocks Mined
AntPool 19.53 9, 078
F2Pool 16.43 7, 635
BTCC Pool 10.5 4, 874
BitFury 8.71 4, 050
BW.COM 8 3, 717
SlushPool 5.26 2, 447
ViaBTC 4.8 2, 222
Bixin 4.12 1, 947
BTC.TOP 4 1, 857
BTC.com 3.55 1, 648
Total Analyzed 84.9 39, 475
Other Miners 15.1 6, 996
Table 4.2: Mining power distribution in a scenario from 2013 until 2015, considering
the 10 major mining pools.
Mining Pool Mining Power (%) Blocks Mined
F2Pool 13.53 10, 548
GHash.IO 13.3 10, 370
BTC Guild 7.37 5, 749
AntPool 6.82 5, 323
Eligius 4.99 3, 889
BitFury 4.73 3, 693
BTCC Pool 3.9 3, 042
SlushPool 3.37 2, 627
KNCMiner 3.12 2, 432
BW.COM 2.67 2, 064
Total Analyzed 63.8 49, 737
Other Miners 36.2 28, 225
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Figure 4.3: Number of transactions approved from occasionalminers andmining pools
from 2013 until 2017.
4.1.2 Unconfirmed Transactions
Another relevant concern about scalability in blockchains, is the number of
transaction requests the system can accept. As we state in Chapter 4.2.1,
throughput (γ ) may vary according to Q , T and tq . The difficulty of the
Bitcoin proof-of-work is adjusted according to the hashing power of the entire
Bitcoin network so that the average time to mine a block, T , will always be
around a certain value. In our analysis, we prove that T stays stable for the
whole time and this value is set at 10minutes. In this interval of time, since the
block size Q is set to a limit of 1mb, the system can approximately approve,
if we consider an average tq of 500 bytes, 3.3 transactions per second. This
value is calculated considering the maximum possible block size of 1mb. If we
consider the time between 2013 and 2017, the number of daily transactions
that need to be approved scaled from fifty thousand in 2013 to three hundred
thousand in 2017, and all blocks are filled over their maximum capacity since
April 2016, as Figure 4.4 shows. Because of this scaling limitation, transactions
might be willing to pay more fee in order to get accepted in miner’s mempools.
To improve the number of transactions that can be accepted per second by
the system, we consider an eventual change of T and Q , since we analyzed
that the average tq is constant and equal to 500 bytes for the whole period of
4.1 SCALAB IL ITY 41
Figure 4.4: Average block size every month, from 2013 until 2017.
testing.
Block Creation Time T
In our assumptions, listed in Table 3.2, we argue that an increment of T may
lead to a drop in γ and an increment on tl , for that reason we believe that it is
a better choice to adjust the difficulty of the proof-of-work in order to have a
shorter block creation time rather than increasing it. Furthermore, according
to Equation 2.2, the cost of mining a block is directly proportional to the block
creation time, which means that if the T is decreased, the cost of mining a
block is less. Thanks to our data frame D, we managed to prove that there is an
inverse proportionality between γ and T . Only in blocks with a creation time
lower than 10minutes, the throughput reaches peaks of 10-14 transactions per
second, while in cases from 10 to 20minutes of creation time, the throughput
is between 2-4 transactions per second and in blocks where the T is higher
than 20minutes, throughput never reaches 2 transactions per second.
Our assumptions about transaction latencies were partially right. It is true that
tl tends to grow along with T , but this is true only if T ≥ 10minutes. If the
block is mined before that time then we do not have any relation between
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transaction latency and block creation time. We suspected that this uncertain
relation might be somehow connected with who mined that particular block.
While mining pools may have different criteria (higher transaction fee) while
appending transactions to be mined, occasional miners might have none, or less.
This is the reason why the tl is so random if t is mined by an occasional miner,
since transactions are not selected according to any criteria, so a transaction t
that did not offer any fee and has been waiting to be approved for long time,
might be included by some occasional miner if it luckily wins the proof-of-work
before the 10minutes time. After some tests, we show the results in Figure 4.5.
As suspected, for 0 ≤ T ≤ 7, the occasional miners take the 21.3% of mining
share, while in the other portions they never reach the 18% of the total blocks
mined.
In conclusion, an increment of T is ill-judged, while decrementing it should
be considered, acknowledging, according to Equation 2.4, that an increased
bandwidth for a better inner node communication is needed, otherwise we
might have an exponential growth on Porphan . Furthermore, in Chapter 4.3.1,
we state that with a higher T the profit 〈Π〉 of a miner is significantly lower.
Block Size Q
If the creation time T tends to have a fixed value, then Q plays a big role
in throughput limitations. Discussions on whether to increase the block size
limit or not are still ongoing and this issue has been brought up in several
papers [40, 21]. Increasing the block size limit leads to a bigger amount of
transactions that could be accepted at every block creation time, so we may
think that this could be the right solution to adopt in order to increase the
performance of the system. Anyway there is a big controversy on this topic,
and even the biggest entities in the Bitcoin system do not agree to a solution.
Some such as CoinBase, Blockchain.info or BTC Guild, deem that is beneficial
to increase the block size, some others like F2Pool or Ethereum are neutral
and other entities, for example GreenAddress, Bitrated or Bitcoinpaygate, think
that this is just pushing the problem a little further and is not a good solution.
In our assumptions we also state that transaction fee tf may decrease with an
increment of the block size limit, since transactions do not compete for space
in the block anymore. So a small block size will require higher fees for fast
confirmation, which will bring the following pros (+) and cons (−) [16]:
+ It will no longer be cheap to spam transactions such as Satoshi Dice
bets [51].
+ Fees will not be zero. This is eventually a necessity in order to encourage
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Figure 4.5: Number of blocks mined by mining pools and occasional miners according
their creation time.
miners and secure the mining ecosystem.
− Bitcoin may look unattractive to new users, having high fees.
− Users pay higher fees.
We tested not only that the tf is related to the increment of the block size
limit, but thanks to our evaluations presented in Figures 4.11-4.12, we can
state that from when the blockchain started to become saturated in mid
2016 (Figure 4.4), tf but also the fee density ρ had a big increment, which
is a sign that the blockchain is needing an urgent change according to avoid
scalability problems. Increasing the block size limit is one of the possible
solutions, but we have to consider that it might not only be good for users,
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but also bad for miners. The cost of mining increase along with the block size,
so receiving no more fees from users would be costly effective and lead to a
centralization problem, since larger blocks make full nodes more expensive to
operate, having then less hashers running full nodes, discouraging in that way
miners to join the network. If we consider now the statement that block size
limit should be increased, these are the arguments against it:
• Orphan rate amplification.
• Damage to centralization.
• "Congestion" concerns can be solved with mempool improvements in-
cluding transaction eviction.
• No amount of max block size would support all the world’s future trans-
actions on the main blockchain (various types of off-chain transactions
are the only long-term solution).
In conclusion, even if we think that an immediate increment of the block size is
not the final solution to the scalability problem, we believe that an immediate
and temporary solution should be considered to avoid network congestion, too
high tl and drastic increment of tf . This temporary solution might be the block
size limit increment, especially if big mining pools such as F2Pool claim that
they could support a maximum block size of 20mb [16].
4.2 Performance
Together with scalability, performance is one of our main subject to study on
Bitcoin and we can say that it is highly related with scalability. In Chapter 4.1.2
we already talked about throughput γ and how it is related to the block size Q
and block creation time T . We are now going to focus on the Bitcoin network
performance from both, user side (tl ) and system side (γ ). Moreover, our target
by studying transaction latency tl is to verify our assumptions whether there
is any relation between tf and tl during the whole period analyzed. These
tests are strictly related to the cost and fee problems (Chapter 4.3), and are
important to make users aware whether is possible to pay for bandwidth in




As we state in Chapter 4.1.2,γ is highly dependent onQ and tq , but also related
to T . Block size limit can set the number of transactions the network can
confirm per block, thereby the throughput of the whole Bitcoin network. In
Figure 4.6 we show how throughput has changed during the years. We want
to clarify that in 2013 the system was not performing less, there were just
less transactions to process, roughly fifty thousands per day, and only when
the blocks started to get saturated in mid 2016, the system began to use its
maximum throughput capacity of ∼3-4 transactions per second. However, if
compared to centralized trusted-oriented system, throughput is extremely low.
Assumptions in Table 3.2 about throughput were correct, and in order to have
a higher throughput, Q needs to be bigger, T lower, or both. However, an
increment on γ will bring a raise on the cost 〈C〉 ifQ is changed, and a growth
of Porphan with also repercussions on 〈C〉 if T is lowered.
Figure 4.6: Throughput (γ ) of the Bitcoin blockchain calculated in a period from 2013
until 2017.
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4.2.2 Transaction Latency tl
Another important aspect of performance regards the bandwidth that Bitcoin
could offer to users. We considered the latency tl of every transaction, which
is the time necessary for t to be approved by the network. We want to find out
how and why tl and tf changed during these years pointing out, if any, the
relation between these two attributes, so that users are aware while paying a
certain tf , in how much time approximately their transactions will be approved
and confirmed by the network. We observed that from 2013 to 2017, while the
average transaction latency did not vary much and was stable at ∼15 minutes,
the fee paid from users to the miners has undergone a relevant raise, from
an average of 0.0001B to 0.0004B, with peaks of 0.0012B in 2017, where
the Bitcoin price is also 2000 times higher than in 2013. In our assumptions
(Table 3.2) we show how tl could be affected by other attributes in the system.
Assumptions on τ and γ are immediate, so the transaction latency will increase
if the propagation time grows and will decrease if the throughput gets higher.
Other assumptions required a deeper study, for example, we analyzed the
relation between block size Q and transaction latency tl . We divided the
block size in categories, then plotted these categories in relation with tl and
grouped the whole dataset by year, Figure 4.7. As we suspected, during the
years, whenever there was an increment on the block size, transaction latency
had a drop. In 2016 when we had the final increment to 1mb, the latency
started to become incredibly low, while in 2017 when the blocks started to get
saturated we have a latency up to 9 times higher, plus, smaller blocks in 2017
verify a much higher transaction latency since they include less transactions
than the amount that need to be approved.
Not much intuitive and more difficult to study was the relation between tl
fee and tf . According to the analysis made on tf we categorized the fee paid
from users to miners and then we split the data frame per year. Table 4.3
enhance this categorization and Figure 4.8 shows the plot generated while
analyzing more than one hundred twenty million of transactions from 2013
to 2017. As Table 4.3 and Figure 4.8 enhance, the fee paid from users has
a bigger impact year by year on the available bandwidth the system offers.
Our assumptions about this relation were right, and especially after the blocks
started to get saturated in mid 2016 there was big change in the way miners
include transactions. If during 2013 and 2014, miners andmining pools tended
to include in blocks a compromise between fee and waiting time, in 2017
miners tend to completely ignore 0-fee transactions. This could be good to
avoid transaction spamming and it is good for miners that are gaining more
from mining, since the block reward is halved every two hundred ten thousand
blocks. On the other hand, impatient users need to pay a higher fee to see their
transactions approved faster. Furthermore, we can state that in 2017, 0-fee
transactions have a latency of∼33hours,4 times bigger than 2016,8 times than
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Figure 4.7: Relation between tl and Q from 2014 until 2017.
2015, and more than 16 times bigger than 2013 and 2014, which means that
the problem of block saturation has been partially considered by some miners
with 0-fee transactions eviction. Today miners are using fork mechanism such
as BitcoinABC [47] and they tend to exclude 0-fee transactions, so users should
be aware that, a 0-fee transaction might not be mined at all.
4.3 Costs and Fees
This Section aims to show the changes in tips and tolls in Bitcoin system from
2013 to 2017. Möser and Böhme [34], claim that the hard size limit still does
not affect the level of the fee paid. We want to enhance instead, that nowadays
the saturation problem significantly drives the fee paid from users in order
to get more bandwidth or to be accepted at all. Furthermore, at the time of
analysis (2015), Bitcoin claimed that the fees were lower than 0.1% while
today we analyzed (Figure 4.15) to have an average percentage of 0.25%,
which is more than the double. Plus we want to consider the mining cost for
miners, from what it is driven and how it will change in the past years. When
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Table 4.3: Table representing the results in Figure 4.8, showing how tl might vary for
each category of fee.
Fee category tf value (B) tl variation (h)
0 tf = 0 1 to 33
<0.0002 0 ≤ tf < 0.0002 0+ to 5+
<0.0004 0.0002 ≤ tf < 0.0004 0+ to 2.5
<0.0006 0.0004 ≤ tf < 0.0006 0+ to 1.5
<0.0008 0.0006 ≤ tf < 0.0008 0+ to 1
<0.001 0.0008 ≤ tf < 0.001 0+ to 1
<0.01 0.001 ≤ tf < 0.01 0+ to 1
<0.1 0.01 ≤ tf < 0.1 0+ to 1.5
>0.1 tf ≥ 0.1 0+ to 2
we talk about fees and tolls we might refer both to miner’s profit and users’
benefits.
4.3.1 Miners’ Profit
The study of how profitable is mining for miners, is complex and a lot of
data analysis and manipulation is required. Knowledge regarding electricity
consumption, mining hardware, and cost of hashing is needed, and a deep
study and data analysis on how the Bitcoin hashing rate and the Bitcoin price
in usd changed during the years has to be taken into consideration. Making
assumptions aboutmining costs/profitsmight be difficult due to the information
withheld frommining pools. We think though, that this is an important concern
and it has to be addressed and studied, since the block reward is even halved
every two hundred ten thousand blocks, and miners should find another way
to profit from mining. Solutions for miners might be to additionally charge
users with higher fees or to optimize their mining profit 〈Π〉 by analyzing the
costs 〈C〉 and the revenue 〈V 〉 over time. We refer to Equations 2.2, 2.3, 2.5 in
order to calculate 〈C〉, 〈V 〉 and 〈Π〉. For the reckoning we had to adapt our
data and formulas to the Bitcoin price and Bitcoin total hash rate H at the time
when data were generated. To do so, we extracted our time information from
D, collected json data regarding H and Bitcoin price from blockchain.info
and finally fitted them in order to get 〈Π〉, 〈C〉 and 〈V 〉. Equation 2.5 gives us
information in order to calculate 〈C〉 and 〈V 〉, and we use a propagation time
of τ = 15.7 seconds, considering in that way a scenario with an average block
size of 1mb and a 50% propagation; in addition, we contemplate an electricity
cost of 0.04$/kWh (Chinese price, since AntPool is a Chinese mining pool),
and examining the most powerful mining hardware on the market for Bitcoin,
AntMiner S9 [54], having a hashing power of h = 14, 000, 000MH/s and a
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Figure 4.8: Relation between tl and tf grouped by year.
consumption of 1375W,with an overall cost per hash of η = 1.091×10−18 $/H.
A similar analysis on electricity consumption and cost of mining was made by
Croman et al. [14] in 2016. For our calculations,we only considered transactions
from late 2016 and 2017, when Bitcoin’s price was already over 1000 $, before
that, data might contain too many outliers due to huge differences in Bitcoin’s
hashing rate and Bitcoin price, and they could drive the analysis to an incorrect
status. Figure 4.9, shows how theminer’s profit is relatedwith the block creation
time and how, after 15-20minutes, the miner starts to decrease its profit. This
is caused by the constant growth of the cost necessary to mine a block, 〈C〉,
which is directly proportional to the cost per hash η and the block creation
time T . Is important to enhance that Figure 4.9 shows the profit 〈Π〉 for a
single miner, using AntMiner S9, and that in a real case scenario we might
have hundreds of computers working together, so the possibilities to find a new
block are much higher and the revenue 〈V 〉 is accordingly bigger, having then
much greater profit that needs to be shared among all the miners.
Furthermore, as we will see in Chapter 4.3.2, miners most likely include trans-
actions with a higher fee density (ρ), so if users are not willing to pay more
fee, once all the best ρ-wise transactions are already included in the new
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Figure 4.9: Profit 〈Π〉 in relation with block creation time T while mining with
AntMiner S9 from 2015 until 2017.
upcoming block but Q is not reached yet, miners have to include lower fee
density transactions, having in that way a loss in their profit. So if we look at
it from a miner’s prospective, the increment of Q might not be the best choice
in the long run, unless the fees are standardized in a way that every miner
has a guaranteed profit. If back in 2009-2013 the block revenue was poorly
influenced by user’s fees and it relied more on the reward R, we can see instead
in Figure 4.10, that R is decreasing while the fees are getting higher, and we
expect M to overcome R by 2020 when the reward is halved again at 6.25B.
We have seen that the block profit 〈Π〉 is highly influenced by users’ fees tf ,
unfortunately, more miners will request for fee, more users are discouraged to
pay with Bitcoin. Furthermore we noticed a strong link between the halving of
R in mid 2016 and the increment of tf . Because of that we analyzed transaction
fees offered by users to see how they are influenced in paying more or less B to
the miners during they years.
Miner Profit Function
To have a mathematical idea of what is happening between miner’s profit
and creation time, we define f 2〈Π〉 as the Miner Profit Function, and represents
it in Equation 4.1, which is inferred after our analysis on almost twenty-five
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Figure 4.10: Miners revenue 〈V 〉 divided in block reward R and sum of all tf s in a
block, M , analyzed between 2013 and 2015. Data are represented daily,
and the R and M values are sums of every specific day.
thousand blocks, considering a single miner using AntMiner S9, and having T
in minutes as input.










with 0 ≤ T < 80 (4.1)
To optimize the profit 〈Π〉, according to f 2〈Π〉, the difficulty should never be
increased in a way to have a creation time T >> 20minutes otherwise miners
have a loss in their profit, and for miner’s sake, should be even better to slightly
decrease T according to avoid useless computation that leads to a higher cost
and waste of electricity. We also generate, to have a more accurate trend, f 39〈Π〉,
which is also shown in Figure 4.9 but not mathematically represented, being
a 39 degrees polynomial. We could use this trend though to assume that the
real profit occurs between 3 and 8 minutes, while having less or more creation
time the 〈Π〉 will not be optimized.
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4.3.2 Users’ Benefits
In order to make assumptions and conclusions on how users should use their
fee to optimize their bandwidth in the system, we first analyze how the tf
changed during time. Figure 4.11, shows the numerical attribute tf divided into
categories and represented in percentage for each category. We can notice that,
after the first half of 2016, fees between 0B and 0.0002B almost disappeared
from the system, and considering that the Bitcoin price raised from less than
1000$ to more than 5000$ between mid 2016 and second half of 2017, this
results to be as a huge increment on the fees paid to miners, especially if
we consider that, if we compare the Bitcoin price and the fee paid in usd,
we see a substantial co-movement which indicates that btc is the dominant
unit of account when deciding about the fee offers. Is possible also to see this
increment in Figure 4.10, indeed the total tf paid to miners almost reaches
1000B per day 2017. We can also see that we had higher fees early in 2013,
but at the time the usd price for Bitcoin was less than 120$ so respectively
the fees were much lower. We believe that, events happening on the Bitcoin
blockchain might influence fee, tolls and the way blocks choose transactions,
and to confirm our assumptions we see that the biggest increment in tf was
in late 2016, which coincides with the halving of R and the blocks saturation.
To see how miners change their behavior according to events happening on
Figure 4.11: Transaction fee (tf ) distribution during the years from 2013 until 2017.
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the Bitcoin system we study the fee density ρ, defined in Equation 3.6 and
displayed in Figure 4.12. Fee density and fee are directly connected, since the
transaction size tq has an average of 500 bytes, but at the end of 2017, even if
we have some fees with < 0.0001B, we almost never have transactions with
a ρ = 0, which means that recently, miners might have changed from having
constraints on fees to having constraints on fee density. This drastic change in
Figure 4.12: Fee density (ρ) distribution during the years from 2013 until 2017.
tf and ρ lead us to think that there is another factor which is influenced by it,
and in our assumptions we thought it was the transaction latency tl . This is the
reason why, we analyzed tl in function of tf from 2013 to 2017 (Figure 4.8) for
an overall trend, and then tl in function of tf and ρ for transactions occurred in
2017 to generate our prediction models. As also Figure 4.8 shows, is not good
to invest in so much high fees, since after a certain threshold, the latency would
be even higher. With our models we want to define these thresholds and give
users some ideas on how they might invest wisely their money, according to
optimize their bandwidth. With data regarding transactions evaluated in 2017
we generate two models, Fee Density - Latency Function, ftl (ρ), represented
in Equation 4.3, and Latency Function, ftl (tf ) presented in Equation 4.2. In
Figures 4.13, 4.14, due to our interpolation function’s boundaries, we show two
different degrees of polynomial interpolation, f 2tl and f
39
tl . The purpose of f
2
tl
is to have a general equation to refer on while talking about fees and latency,
while the f 39tl gives us more strict thresholds about the trend our data tend to
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follow, for example in Figure 4.8 we see that in 2017, if you pay more than
0.001B, you most likely get an increment in your transaction approval time,
and in Figure 4.13, f 39tl shows this threshold while f
2
tl does not.
f 2tl (tf ) = 6248x2 − 555.8x + 1.42 (4.2)
Figure 4.13: Interpolation with a 2 and 39 degrees polynomial of the relation between
tf and tl , for transactions analyzed in 2017.






x + 1.598 (4.3)
We can define in that way the thresholds in which our functions might work
and they might be the following:
0 ≤ tf ≤ 0.0011,
and
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 460.
If the f 2tl function is used to make predictions and your tf and ρ are outside
this thresholds, then predictions might not be accurate and plus, you might be
losing more money while getting even an higher latency. In conclusion, with
data collected for the whole 2017, we can state that a user can definitely pay
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Figure 4.14: Interpolation with a 2 and 39 degrees polynomial of the relation between
ρ and tl , for transactions analyzed in 2017.
for bandwidth in Bitcoin’s applications but it shouldn’t be willing to offer more
than 0.0011B or it might waste those money for no reasons. In addition, if
nowadays miners tend to consider ρ rather than tf , is good for users to know
that an optimal ρ according to get higher latency would be between 200 and
300 sat/byte.
Now if we consider our tf as a percentage of the total output tou , where tf % =
(tf × 100)/tou , also the overall percentage tf % had a consistent increment
during the years and from all mining pools, like Figure 4.15 shows, going from
less than 0.05% between 2013 and 2015, to more than 0.2%, reaching also
0.3% in 2017. Considering now that the Bitcoin price raised from 1000$ to
more than 7000$ in the last two years, this increment in the tf % results as a
huge addition to the costs for users, and Bitcoin might not be as cheap as it
claims to be.
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Figure 4.15: Average % of tf paid from users to the top 20miners of all times, grouped
by year.
4.4 Is Bitcoin a Green-Wise Choice?
After calculating the miner’s consumption related to the revenue we are con-
cerned to know which is the impact of Bitcoin network on the environment. To
know the electricity cost of mining in the Bitcoin network is necessary to know
exactly how many miners are running and how much is their consumption.
Unfortunately no one really knows how many miners are active and running in
the network and this number changes every day, plus we don’t have information
about which miner’s hardware is used but we could estimate they are in the
order of hundred thousands, they group in mining pools and we could consider
they are using the most powerful mining hardware on market at the time of
analysis which is AntMiner S9. The problem of consumption is that, even if
there are hundreds, thousands or ten thousands of miners in the network, they
will approve anyway 3-4 transactions per second but they will use, accordingly,
more consumption of electricity. Now, if we make assumptions on transaction
consumption, considering a relatively low number of miners, with peaks of
one hundred fifty thousand and all of them using AntMinerS9, we would have
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a consumption between 400 and 500Kwh per transaction, and if we grant
that an average consumption of a house in the United States, which is one
of the highest in the world, is of 11000Kwh per year, consuming then about
30Kwh per day, we can say that Bitcoin is anything but a green choice. The
problem of Bitcoin consumption is that it only depends on how many miners
are active in the network and if the Bitcoin price is rising then there could be
more eager individuals willing to join, causing an increment of the difficulty to
solve the proof-of-work so the system is anyways able to produce blocks every
10minutes with a defined maximum size of 1mb, but the overall consumption
of the network will be higher. So every time the difficulty is raised also the
consumption will increase accordingly. It might be good then to mine in places
where the electricity is produced using renewable energy and also trying to
avoid the inclusion of stand alone miners, otherwise they would work without
ever mine a block, consuming a lot of energy. Even if our evaluation shows
a downward estimation, the Bitcoin economy has a consumption only of a
thousandth if compared to the whole oil industry per hour. We estimate for
Bitcoin a consumption of 4.32Gwh per hour while in the Statistical Review of
World Energy from BP [5] they show that the oil industry has a consumption of
5600Gwh per hour. Until Bitcoin would be that competitive for eager miners,
then the difficulty is intended to grow leading the cryptocurrency into a really
costly and consuming scenario, plus always less miners will be able to enjoy
reward benefits and they will end up mining for nothing with more electricity
consumption and consequence of that would be the increment of the fees, but
that would attract even more miners and here we are at the earlier scenario. A
solution to that might be to regulate the miners traffic by controlling and auto-
adjusting the number of miners which can join the network, in that way the




This Chapter aims to highlight the most relevant observations while running
bas and to proof whether our assumptions were accurate or not, providing an
explanation and also an estimation of how the system might change in the next
years. We compare previous results with ours and we give opinions on the hot
topics in Bitcoin, regarding the block size, the fees and miner’s profit and then
we discuss and test the accuracy of our prediction models. We evaluate that
scalability issues brought to a centralization problem. When it comes about
mining, the scenario changes from distributed to decentralized because of
mining pools. Then we state that in order to increase the system performance
and scalability an eventual change on T and Q should be considered with all
the advantages and disadvantages that these changes might lead to. Finally we
generate prediction models about the miner’s profit and the transaction latency
according to the fee paid and the fee density for each transaction, and this is
profitable either for miners and users so the firsts need to have a guaranteed
gain in mining while the seconds need to get a faster confirmation time by
optimizing their fees.
5.1 Results
When Bitcoin was first implemented, one of its strength was the decentral-
ization. Miners could join the network all over the world and more miners
meant a more secure network. During the years though, the reward enticed
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always more people around the world and newminers kept joining the network
increasing in that way the difficulty to solve the puzzle, since the creation time
should be kept fixed at 10minutes. Consequently, the Bitcoin hashing power
kept growing, so it became more difficult for single individuals to mine new
blocks, decreasing in that way the chances for miners to gain their reward and
leaving space in the network to mining pools, since they can gather up miners
as well as their hashing power. This led to a scenario where singular individ-
uals need to join bigger mining pools and the whole network changed from
distributed to decentralized since mining pools are controlled by third parties
society so they control a big portion of the hashing power needed to mine
new blocks. Furthermore, large mining pools nowadays withhold information
about number of miners, the hardware they use or they profit, making the
centralization in the system even more enhanced. Being one of Bitcoin value
proposition trustlessness, Bitcoin is only useful if is decentralized, since central-
ization requires trust. The other problem in scalability regards the amount of
transactions to be approved every day by the Bitcoin system, and we have seen
that this number is constrained by Q , T and tq and since the transaction size
will always be around 400-500 bytes, we consider a change in the block sizeQ
and in the block creation time T . Table 5.1 shows the results and our assump-
tions after a longitudinal study on the Bitcoin blockchain. Decreasing Q might
appear a good solution for the number of advantages it has, but the only two
disadvantages are critical for both performance and scalability matters, while
it could be much easier to deal with the orphan rate amplification. For that
reason a decrease on the block size is ill-judged. We have instead an opposite
scenario with the block creation time. An increment would be ill-judged since
the system will not be scalable, will be less performing and miners will have
less profit while mining with the only advantage to have a lower orphaning
rate.
As we can observe from Table 5.1, throughput γ increase when either the block
size Q is raised or the creation time T is lowered, a good compromise of both
might be the solution to part of the scalability and performance problems in
the Bitcoin network. According to Croman et al. [14], the block size should
not exceed 4mb given a creation time of 10minutes. We assume that a good
compromise could be to increase the block size limit at 1.5mb and lower the
creation time at 8minutes. In that way the system will perform an average of
5-6 transactions per second with a creation time of 10minutes, reaching 10
transactions per second if the 8minutes interval is respected.
While we can not define a relation between Q and tf , since they are related
only when a drastic change in the block size is made in the network, we can
state that, from 2013 to 2017 the relation between tf and tl day by day more
noticeable, having almost an inverse proportionality in the latest data from
2017 as displayed in Figure 4.8. We represent this relation with Equation 4.2.
5.1 RESULTS 61
Table 5.1: Scalability and performance scenario and consequences if block size Q and
block creation time T are increased or decreased.
Higher ↑ Lower ↓
Q
+ more scalability and
transactions accepted
per day
+ less latency tl
−/+ lower fees, good for
users bad for miners
− orphan rate amplifica-
tion






+ no transaction spam
+ no 0-fee transactions
+ less mining cost
+ less propagation time
+ less chance of orphan-
ing
−/+ higher fees, good for
miners bad for users
− less throughput
− more latency tl
T
+ orphaning rate much
lower
+ no physical changed
needed to support faster
inner node communica-
tion
− lower throughput γ un-
less Q is increased
− system not very scalable
unless Q is increased
− profit 〈Π〉 is confined
+ higher throughput γ
+ system is more scalable
+ profit 〈Π〉 much higher
for miners
+/− not much information
about tl but for sure it
will not drastically in-
crease
− faster inner node com-
munication is required
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In 2017 0-fee transactions almost disappeared from the system and that is due
to the incredibly high latency they were facing, since it took an average of
33hours to get confirmed and included in a block by some miner. If only this
fee is raised less than 0.0002B, the transaction latency drops to an average of
5hours, and with a fee between 0.0008B and 0.001B the average expected
latency is less than 1hour.
Regarding fees and tolls in the network we estimate the profit of a miner
using AntMiner S9 [54] as mining hardware. We put in a relation the profit
of a single block mined with its creation time. Once we collected enough data
and calculated the profit, we inferred a possible trend for 〈Π〉 and called it
Miner Profit Function, f〈Π〉. We used Numpy libraries [36] for the interpolation
(Appendix C.10) and we perform a regression of 2 and 39 degrees function
to see how the trend changes if the polynomial level is increased. Figure 4.9
shows both functions interpolated plus the samples for each block in 2017
and we define f 2〈Π〉 in Equation 4.1 while we use f
39
〈Π〉 more like a reference to
set our boundaries and see where the profit tend to increase or maintain its
value after a certain amount of time. We state that for the first 2minutes and
after 20minutes is not profitable to produce new blocks, while is good to have
a creation time between 3 and 8minutes. We finally tested the accuracy of
our Miner Profit Function, f 2〈Π〉, using scikit-learn libraries [39] and calculating
the mae as shown in Appendix C.11. We considered then as predictors, our
dataframe D, and we used as target values for accuracy tests, data retrieved
on a newer portion of the blockchain for every blocks occurred between the
4th and the 11th of November 2017, and they turned out to have a median
absolute error of mae = 0.00002455B.
The other two functions inferred are shown in Equations 4.2, 4.3 and they try
to optimize users’ bandwidth according to the fee these users are willing to
pay for their transactions. Like in the Miner Profit Function, we evaluate a
polynomial level of 2 and 39 degrees, and while the first one is the reference
for our prediction models f 2tf and f
2
ρ , the second one is useful to give us an idea
about the boundaries of these models. Unfortunately, since rules behind the
inclusion in a block are not yet well defined, and mining pools could change
these rules, for example they possibly have changed the transaction eviction
for 0-fee transactions to an eviction for the 0-ρ transactions, and the block is
generated after a random number of minutes, the predictions on the available
bandwidth for users are not as accurate as the one for the miners’ profit, having
an mae = 1.2hours in f 2tf and an mae = 1.03hours in f
2
ρ . We ran these
tests, as in the Miner Profit Function, in a newer portion of the blockchain,
between the 4th and the 11th of November 2017. However, thanks to our
f 39 interpolation we can define the boundaries in which this functions are
reliable, plus, Figure 4.8 gives a good overview of the transaction approval time
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trend in relation to the fee paid and according to both measurements, paying
more than 0.001B would be non profitable for users. Furthermore, we believe
that nowadays miners changed their inclusion rules from a priority on tf to a
preference on ρ, this is the reason for us to infer also f 2ρ . However, fee density is
not dependent form users, since it is calculated considering also the transaction
size tq . For that reason, users should tend to consider a tf = 0.001B as the
limit for their fees, no matter how much is the amount transferred.
5.2 Discussion
Despite the withhold of information form mining pools and the difficulty in
retrieving the blockchain, containing sometimes not convincing data, e.g. a
negative creation time for some blocks mostly before 2013, we are satisfied
about our studies and the results obtained. We managed to perform a lon-
gitudinal study on the Bitcoin blockchain, analyzing more transactions than
any previous work, collecting recent data of 2017 and combining different
data sources to get even more information, all stored in our data structure
that aims to give all the information regarding blocks and transactions, saving
up 10 times the amount of disk space. We could also, using machine learning
techniques, infer useful functions effective for both users and miners, in order
to gain more profit out of the mining process. Creating our data analytics
system might not have been the easiest solution, but it was the one which
allowed us to retrieve the exact information we wanted without storing the
whole blockchain. We had trouble using Bitcoin’s api since the website was not
always available plus it prevents from having too many requests at the same
time; because of that we spent more than a month to be able to retrieve all
the information we wanted and to find a way to store them nicely in a way
to be easily retrieved. With all the data collected and our data structure D we
were able to verify our assumption on scalability, performance and finally to
generate prediction models that even if are constrained and reliable only for a
small interval of data input, they give an idea of how entities should behave in
Bitcoin system.
Despite we inferred our models, giving information on how miners and users
could use their time and money, the creation time T is still a random process,
determined by the proof of work, and how lucky miners are to find the solution.
Because of that, paying so much fee, tf , will not guarantee an extremely fast
execution, but at least your transaction will be considered as "high priority" in
more mining pools according to the amount of its tf .
It is also important to note that the problem of scalability has been taken
into serious consideration and nowadays smart contracts like rsk [28] are
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emerging, claiming to scale almost as much as PayPal even though they are not
still in common use and maybe more testing on those will be necessary.
And finally, the problem of consumption is also urgent, moving also prominent
characters such as Bram Cohen (inventor of BitTorrent) to launch new green
cryptocurrencies such as Chia [38], since he claims that a Bitcoin transaction
wastes as much as electricity as it takes to power an American home for a week,
and we tested that it might be true, comparing the Bitcoin system to the whole
oil industry.
Another issue while performing the longitudinal study was the pricing and
money value of Bitcoin. It’s hard to make prediction when the currency is
affected by such high volatility. Usually the Bitcoin price tends to raise if there
is an unstable situation in the global market and it frequently goes down when
Bitcoin currency is involved in scandals such as the bankrupt of Mt Gox [37],
once the biggest Bitcoin exchange on the market, money laundering and black
marked related issue, since people are willing to spend less money in Bitcoin
if something like that happens in the system.
5.3 Future Implementation
By profiling bas we were able to understand what we could improve. For per-
formance evaluation we used a line-by-line profiling for Python [26], displayed
in Appendix D. We divided the computation in plot and retrieval, then retrieval
in fetch and write. The fetching of data takes the 85.5% of the total time, while
the writing of data only the 13.8%. The 99.9% of the computation in data
fetching is due to the api calls on blockchain.info. For that reason, the system
still suffers in performance but we could get faster latency in the future if we
alter the primitives of data retrieval in a way to have bigger portions retrieved
and less connections to establish.
Further analyses should take into consideration a more accurate estimation
about the impact Bitcoin has on the environment. This could be done by
studying the number of miners in the network and which kind of mining
software is used, even if these data are kept secret by mining pools. The fact
is, that Bitcoin has an high electricity consumption and it is intended to grow
along with the Bitcoin hashing rate, so further studies and concerns about this
topic should be considered and we believe that in the near future, the focus on
cryptocurrencies will address in that direction.
A future useful feature of bas might be a short-time model prediction. We
thought about it as a retrieval of the last weekly transactions in the system,
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then, a real time model is generated, giving to users information about the fee
they should pay in order to optimize their latency at a reasonable costs.
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full node: in a decentralized digital currency peer-2-peer network, is a node
that stores and processes the entirety of every block, storing locally the
entire size of the blockchain.
light node: in a decentralized digital currency peer-2-peer network, is a node
that only stores the part of the blockchain it needs.
satoshi: Unit of the Bitcoin currency. 100,000,000 satoshi are 1 B.
51% Attack: 51% refers to an attack on a blockchain, by a group of miners
controlling more than 50% of the network’s mining hash rate, or com-
puting power. The attackers would be able to prevent new transactions
from gaining confirmations, allowing them to halt payments between
some or all users. They would also be able to reverse transactions that
were completed while they were in control of the network, meaning they
could double-spend coins. They would almost certainly not be able to
create new coins or alter old blocks, so a 51% attack would probably not
destroy Bitcoin or another blockchain-based currency outright, even if it





tB number of transaction approved in a block B.
tin transaction input in bitcoin (B). All the money sent.
tou transaction output (B). All the money received.
tf transaction fee (B) (Equation 3.3).
tq transaction size, in bytes.
tl commit latency of a single transaction (seconds, minutes, hours)
(Equation 3.4).




76 APPEND IX B L IST OF SYMBOLS
t% percentage of tin paid in fee, tf .
T expected block interval time (∼10min)
Porphan probability that given a block is orphaned.
τ block solution propagation time, we consider a τ = 15.7 seconds
according to Croman [14].
tepoch timestamp of a transaction t . Epoch of when t was first seen in
the network
η cost per hash.
〈Π〉 expectation value of a miner’s profit per block.
〈V 〉 expectation value of a miner’s revenue per block.
〈C〉 expectation value of a miner’s hashing cost per block.
R block reward, currently at 12.5 B, halved every 210, 000 blocks.
h miner’s individual hash rate.
H total hash rate of Bitcoin network.
Q block size or block space in bytes/mb.
Q∗ the block size that maximizes the miner’s expected profit.
ρ fee density, or the price per byte for block space. (sat/byte).
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M money in B. Sum of all tf in a block.
Mdemand (b) partial sum of the b transaction fees in mempool in order of
descending fee density.
Msupply(Q) miner’s cost due to orphaning to produce a certain block size Q .
N the set of transactions in a miner’s mempool.
n number of transactions in a miner’s mempool.
B single block.
Bt transaction root that links to every transaction in a block B.




Bmi miner which mined the block B.
γ throughput of Bitcoin network, measured in transactions per
second.




The complete source code can be found at: https://github.com/ted92/Bitcoin-
Analytics-System.
Listing C.1: Creation of Pandas data frame
1 import pandas as pd
2 # a1 , a2 , a3 = lists of attributes
3 df = pd. DataFrame . from_items ([( ’label1 ’, a1), (’
label2 ’, a2), (’label3 ’, a3)])
Listing C.2: Union of df1 and df2 in a new data frame new_df
1 # df1 , df2 = DataFrame
2 new_df = pd. concat ([df1 , df2 ])
Listing C.3: Group by attributes ’a1’ and ’a2’. After that the mean, the sum and the
median is calculated on the other attributes. The method reset_index()
returns a data frame with the original attributes before the groupby was
applied.
1 grouped_df = df . groupby ([’a1’, ’a2’]).mean ().
reset_index ()
2 grouped_df2 = df. groupby ([’a1’, ’a2’]).sum ().
reset_index ()
3 grouped_df2 = df. groupby ([’a1’, ’a2’]). median ().
reset_index ()
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Listing C.4: Count how many occurrences for the attribute ’a1’ and save this number
in a new attribute called ’size’.
1 df = df. groupby (’a1’).size (). to_frame (’size ’).
reset_index ()
Listing C.5: Function for data manipulation. It creates a new column (’date’), from
another (’B_ep’) containing the respective Bepoch transformed in date
time value with days as granularity.
1 def epoch_date_dd (df):
2 # get a data frame with a column of epoch ’B_ep ’,
returns
3 # another column with the date yyyy -mm -dd so it
4 # orders the date by day
5 # :param df: dataframe in input
6 # : return : new dataframe containing the ’date ’
attribute
7 df[’date ’] = df[’B_ep ’]. apply( epoch_datetime )
8 df[’date ’] = df[’date ’]. apply( revert_date_time )
9 df[’date ’] = df[’date ’]. str.slice(start =0, stop
=10)
10 return df




4 block_hash_url = "https :// blockchain .info/ rawblock /"
5
6 def get_json_request (url):
7 # Read the url and get json data.
8 # :param url: str , site where to fetch information
9 # : return : str , data requested in json format
10 json_req = urllib2 . urlopen (url).read ()
11 request = json.loads( json_req )
12 return request
13
14 # get a block given a hash
15 block = get_json_request ( block_hash_url + hash)
16
17 # get the previous block through block attribute ’
prev_block ’
18 hash = block[’prev_block ’]
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Listing C.7: Block object structure obtained using Bitcoin’s apis
1 class Block:
2 def __init__ (self , b):
3 self.hash = b[’hash ’]
4 self. version = b[’ver ’]
5 self. previous_block = b[’prev_block ’]
6 self. merkle_root = b[’mrkl_root ’]
7 self.time = b[’time ’]
8 self.bits = b[’bits ’]
9 self.fee = b[’fee ’]
10 self.nonce = b[’nonce ’]
11 self.n_tx = b[’n_tx ’]
12 self.size = b[’size ’]
13 self. block_index = b[’block_index ’]
14 self. main_chain = b[’main_chain ’]
15 self. height = b[’height ’]
16 self. received_time = b.get(’received_time ’, b[’
time ’])
17 self. relayed_by = b.get(’relayed_by ’)
18 self. transactions = [ Transaction (t) for t in b[’
tx’]]
19 for tx in self. transactions :
20 tx. block_height = self. height
Listing C.8: Transaction object structure obtained using Bitcoin’s apis.
1 class Transaction :
2 def __init__ (self , t):
3 self. double_spend = t.get(’double_spend ’, False)
4 self. block_height = t.get(’block_height ’)
5 self.time = t[’time ’]
6 self. relayed_by = t[’relayed_by ’]
7 self.hash = t[’hash ’]
8 self. tx_index = t[’tx_index ’]
9 self. version = t[’ver ’]
10 self.size = t[’size ’]
11 self. inputs = [Input(i) for i in t[’inputs ’]]
12 self. outputs = [ Output (o) for o in t[’out ’]]
13
14 if self. block_height is None:
15 self. block_height = -1
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Listing C.9: Portion retrieval having a jump J = 10 and a number of blocks retrieved
per time b = 10.
1 global latest_block_url
2 latest_block_url = "https :// blockchain .info/
latestblock "
3
4 jump = 10
5 b = 10
6 if(os.path. isfile (name)):
7 # retrieve data frame from name.csv file
8 df = pd. DataFrame . from_csv (name , sep=’\t’)
9 hash_list = df[’B_h ’]. values
10 # get the last height
11 height_list = df[’B_he ’]. values
12 last_block = height_list [-1]
13 # subtract the jump
14 last_block = int( last_block ) - jump
15 # get the block where to start the new fetching
16 b_array = get_json_request ("https :// blockchain .
info/block - height /" + str( last_block ) + "?
format =json")
17 blocks = b_array [’blocks ’]
18 b = blocks [0]
19 # lget the block hash that has to be fetched
first
20 block_hash = b[’hash ’]
21 # call the method for fetching the blockchain
22 get_blockchain (b, block_hash )
23 else:
24 # file does not exist
25 # retrieve the last block hash
26 latest_block = get_json_request ( latest_block_url )
27 block_hash = latest_block [’hash ’]
28 get_blockchain (b, block_hash )
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Listing C.10: Polynomial interpolation on miner’s profit, 〈Π〉, and creation time, T ,
using Numpy libraries.
1 x = df[’B_T ’]. values
2 y = df[’profit ’]. values
3 new_x , new_y , f = polynomial_interpolation (x, y,
degree =2)
4
5 def polynomial_interpolation (x, y, degree =2):
6 # given two lists of data it generates two new
lists containing the y values interpolated
7 # :param x : x values of the data to interpolate
8 # :param y : y values of the data to interpolate
9 # :param degree : polynomial degree
10 # : return : x and y interpolated values . f is the
polynomial .
11 # order lists
12 together = zip(x, y)
13 sorted_together = sorted ( together )
14 x_vals = [el [0] for el in sorted_together ]
15 y_vals = [el [1] for el in sorted_together ]
16 # calculate polynomial
17 z = np. polyfit (x_vals , y_vals , degree )
18 f = np. poly1d (z)
19 x_new = np. linspace ( x_vals [0], x_vals [-1], len(
x_vals ))
20 y_new = f(x_new)
21 return x_new , y_new , f
Listing C.11: mae accuracy calculation on miner’s profit 〈Π〉 calculated using scikit-
learn libraries in Python.
1 from sklearn . metrics import mean_absolute_error
2 new_x , new_y , f = polynomial_interpolation (x, y,
degree =2)
3 predicted = []
4 samples = df[’B_T ’]. values
5 real = df[’profit ’]. values
6 for float(s) in samples :
7 predicted . append = f(s)




Performance of bas using a line profiler for Python [26]. The profiling was
evaluated running bas on a small dataset D with a size of 46mb. We ran the
profile on the main.py class, to have an overall of the whole bas execution,
then on the transaction retrieval and writing, and finally, on the plotting of
data. Note that, for convenience, not all the lines are listed.
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Timer unit: 1e-06 s
Total time: 103.534 s
File: main.py
Function: main at line 99




111 0.0          opts, args = getopt.getopt(argv, "hipt:d:")
112 0.0          valid_args = False         
114 0.0          for opt, arg in opts:
124 0.0              if opt == "-d":
126 85.5                  jump = basretrieve.fetch_txs(int(arg))
128 13.8                  basretrieve.read_txs_file()
129 0.0                  if os.path.isfile(info_file):
130 0.0                      os.remove(info_file)
131 0.7                  print basmanipulation.get_dataframe_info(jump)
Timer unit: 1e-06 s
Total time: 85.4585 s
File: retrieval.py
Function: fetch_txs at line 87




93 0.0      blocks_to_retrieve = 10
95 0.0      if os.path.isfile(temporary_blocks):
96 0.0          os.remove(temporary_blocks)
99 0.0      if os.path.isfile(temporary_transactions):
100 0.0          os.remove(temporary_transactions)                                  
117 0.8          df = pd.DataFrame.from_csv(dataframe, sep='\t')
118 0.0          height_list = df['B_he'].values
122 11.4         b_array = get_json_request("https://blockchain.info/block-height/" + 
str(last_block) + "?format=json")
123 0.0          blocks = b_array['blocks']
125 0.0          block_hash = b['hash']
126 87.7         get_blockchain(blocks_to_retrieve, block_hash)
Timer unit: 1e-06 s
Total time: 13.5002 s
File: retrieval.py
Function: read_txs_file at line 286




301 0.0      if os.path.isfile(temporary_transactions):
302 0.0          with io.FileIO(temporary_transactions, "r") as file:
303 0.0              file.seek(0)
304 0.1              txs = file.read() # operations on txs are the most expensive ones
306 0.1          list_txs = txs.split("\n")
307 0.0          list_txs.pop()
317 0.0          for el in list_txs:
318 0.0              epoch_list.append(list_txs[i + 1])
319 0.0              list_txs.remove(list_txs[i + 1])
327 0.0          for t in list_txs:
328 75.5              list_txs[i] = ast.literal_eval(t) # parse json transactions
335 0.0          for i in range(len(epoch_list)):
342                                                       temp_input, temp_output, temp_fee_list, temp_size_list, 
temp_approval_time_list, temp_hash_tx = \
343 4.2                  calculate_transactions_fee(list_txs[i], int(epoch_list[i]))
352 0.0          f_percentile = []
353 0.1          for f_in, f_ou in zip(input, output):
354 0.1              if float(f_in)!= 0:
355 0.2                  percentile = 100 - (float(f_ou * 100) / float(f_in))
356 0.1 else:
358 0.1              f_percentile.append(percentile)
389 0.1          for tx in input:
390 0.1              if i < indexes_list[counter]:
391 0.1                  b_s.append(block_size[counter])
392 0.1                  b_ct.append(block_creation_time[counter])
393 0.1                  b_h.append(block_height[counter])
394 0.1                  b_ep.append(block_epoch[counter])
395 0.1                  b_t.append(block_txs[counter])
396 0.1                  b_hash.append(block_hash[counter])
397 0.1                  b_rel.append(block_relayedby[counter])
398 0.1                  i += 1
410 0.0          if os.path.isfile(dataframe):
413 6.3              old_df = pd.DataFrame.from_csv(dataframe, sep='\t') # get data frame
416 0.0              new_df = pd.DataFrame.from_items(
417 0.0                  [('t_ha', hash_tx), ('t_in', input), ('t_ou', output), ('t_f', fee_list), ('t_q', 
size_list),
418 0.0                   ('t_%', f_percentile), ('t_l', approval_time_list),
419 0.0                   ('Q', b_s), ('B_T', b_ct), ('B_he', b_h), ('B_ep', b_ep), ('B_t', b_t),
420 0.1                   ('B_h', b_hash), ('B_mi', b_rel)])   423         1        46862  46862.0      
0.3              new_df = pd.concat([old_df, new_df]) 
433 8.9          new_df.to_csv(dataframe, sep='\t')
Timer unit: 1e-06 s
Total time: 328.466 s
File: plotting.py
Function: plot at line 96




98 0.2      df = basmanipulation.get_dataframe()
101 1.3      plot_reward_fee(df, axes)
105 1.3      plot_profit_multiple_miners(df, axes)
109 3.3      plot_profit_creation_time(df, axes)
113 6.2      plot_total_btc(df, axes)
117 7.4      plot_fee_input_miners(df, axes)
121 1.5      plot_fee_latency(df, axes)
133 8.3      plot_fee_latency_years(df, axes)
137 12.8  plot_blocksize_latency(df, axes)
141 24.6     plot_throughput(df, axes)
145 1.0      plot_creation_time_miners(df, axes)
149 11.5     plot_block_size(df, axes)
157 10.7     plot_trendy_miners(df, axes)





Trading Network Performance for Cash in the
Bitcoin Blockchain - University of Tromsø
Longitudinal study on the Bitcoin blockchain from 2013 to 2017. In our thesis we mainly focus on
three major problems on the Bitcoin blockchain: 1-Scalability. 2-Performance. 3-Fees and Tolls. We
make our assumptions and test the results by analyzing the real blockchain with a data analytics
system created for that purpose, BAS (Blockchain Analytics System), then we propose approaches
that might be followed in order to get more performance in the Bitcoin network by optimizing the
amount of fee paid from users. We also consider miner's revenue and give advide about the right
creation time in order to optimize miner's profit, according to the mining hardware he is usign. We
finally discuss whether is good to increase or not the block size to increase system performance.
Getting Started
\thesis: contains the thesis in .pdf format
\BAS: Blockchain Analytics System folder
\BAS\dataframe: data frame D generated for the analysis
\BAS\info: contains the info.txt file with information about data retrieved
\BAS\plot: plots generated with data retrieved
\BAS\src: source code containing main.py, data_manipulation.py, plotting.py and
retrieval.py
Prerequisites






Usage of the blockchain alaytics system:
observ.py -d number
    -h | --help : usage
    -i          : gives info of the blockchain stored in /info
    -p          : plot data
    -t number   : get the amount of unconfirmed transactions for <number> minutes
    -d j        : retrieve information about transactions and save them in a Panda
DataSet, having a
                jump of j blocks with a default number of blocks retrieved b = 10
Example of use: use -d command for retrieval and set an initial jump J = 10
python main.py -d 10
Note: this jump will remain of 10 even if in the later analysis the variable is changed
once D is created data can be plotted
python main.py -p
Note: to have a nice plotting is suggested to have downloaded at least few months of activity in the
blockchain
reward_fee.png                  : (date, BTC) plot the revenue from the block
reward R compared to the fee from users M
profit_multiple_miners.png      : (creation time, profit) plot the profit using
AntMinerS9 having 1, 50, 100, 500 miners in the mining pool.
profit_creation_time.png        : (creation time, profit) plot the revenue, costs
and profit for miners according the creation time
total_btc.png                   : (date, BTC) total bitcoin in circulation
fee_input_miners.png            : (miners, fee%) comparison between the percentage
of fee paid by the 20 biggest mining pools
fee_latency.png                 : (fee, latency) plot the transaction fee in
relation with the fee latency
txs_fee_distribution.png        : (date, %) plot the transaction fee distribution,
divided in category
txs_feedensity_distribution.png : (date, %) plot the transaction fee density
distribution, divided in category
fee_latency_years.png           : (fee, latency) plot the relation between the
transaction fee and the latency, distributed during years
blocksize_latency.png           : (block size, latency) plot the block size Q in
relation with the transaction latency
throughput.png                  : (date, throughput) plot throughput during time
creation_time_miners.png        : (creation time, blocks mined) bar plot of
occasional miners and mining pools about the creation time
block_size.png                  : (date, block size) plot the block size during
time
top_miners_monthly.png          : (date, blocks) plot the occasional miners and the
mining pools every months according to how many blocks they mine
trendy_miners.png               : (date, transactions) plot the transactions
approved by the 15 major miners during the years
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